

Journal of International Service

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Dear Reader,

Thank you for picking up this copy of the Journal of International Service! It was my absolute honor to serve as the 2017/18 Editor-in-Chief. When you read each piece, I hope you learn at least one new thing about the world around us, the way it works, and the experiences of various people within it. We spent hundreds of man hours on each piece to make sure it became the best it could be and the author walked away with valuable writing techniques they would be able to use in future pieces. The names of the peer reviewers, editors, and senior staff members that you see in these pages are some of the most dedicated individuals you will ever meet and I want to thank each and every one of them. I could not have produced this journal without them. I want to give a special thank you to Emily Bierut, Wendy C. Atieno, and Shannon McNaught for all of their hard work and their impeccable ability to pick up the slack where it was needed, almost without me having to ask. They are the true heroes of this book.

I am also excited that Shannon McNaught will be presiding over the Journal in 2018-2019. I am confident that she will do a wonderful job and continue to grow the prestige and integrity of this journal.

If you like what you read in these pages, I encourage you to either submit your own work or offer your time to the Journal. I know that my experience within this institution was the single most rewarding part of my time at American University and believe whole-heartedly that it is an experience everyone at AU should be able to have.

Without further ado, please enjoy what these pages have to offer you. Follow the lines of questioning each piece gives you. Write in the margins. Explore every word. It is well worth it.

Best,

Valentine Gilson

Hashtag Help: Red Cross Twitter Communication During Disasters

GENA ROBINSON

Special thanks to Beth Pullias, American Red Cross Social Engagement Specialist, and Wendy Harman, former Director of Information Management and Situational Awareness of the American Red Cross, for sharing their time, knowledge, and archived documents on the Red Cross Social Media programs and services.

INTRODUCTION

Communications networks have transformed the way the world works. Paul Starr, professor of public affairs at Princeton and author of *The Creation of the Media: The Political Origins of Modern Communication*, details the development of modern communications in the public sphere as that “of openly accessible information and communication about matters of general concern.”¹ More recently, the Internet has transformed the way the world works. The advent of new technologies used in the public sphere has improved the ability of humanitarian organizations to bring attention to “matters of general concern,” or issues of interest to the greater public, such as disaster response efforts.

On March 21, 2006, Jack Dorsey sent his first tweet on the platform then known as Twttr.² While vowels came later, Dorsey, the founder of Twitter,

¹ Paul Starr, *The Creation of the Media* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 24.

² Lamiat Sabin, “Happy Birthday Twitter: First Ever Tweet Was Sent Nine Years Ago Today,” *Independent*, March 21, 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/happy-birthday-twitter-first-ever-tweet-was-sent-nine-years-ago-today-10124686.html>.

explained that “The definition was a short burst of inconsequential information.” Since 2006, more than 300 million people, including political leaders, have taken to Twitter on a monthly basis, and Twitter has become a source for information and opinions as well as a tool of organizations seeking to communicate in times of disaster.³ In fact, in 2018, Dorsey told the United States Senate Intelligence Committee, “We want to be a global town square, where people from around the world come together in an open and free exchange of ideas.”⁴ Through research on disaster response and social media trends, and interviews with current and former Red Cross Social Media team members, this article examines the American Red Cross and their Digital Disaster Operations Center, analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the Red Cross’ use of Twitter, as well as opportunities for growth and threats to the program. This article focuses on Twitter, and not other social media platforms, because of its use in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, when the author was working for the Red Cross in Indiana.

ORGANIZATIONAL OVERVIEW

When an earthquake devastated Haiti on January 12, 2010, the Red Cross had already begun to integrate social media into disaster communications. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the American Red Cross Twitter account, @RedCross, began receiving tweets from or about people in need of assistance. This marked a turning point, as the Red Cross “began to figure out how to use Twitter ... as a tool to engage with people.”⁵ Prior to 2010,

³ Sabin, “Happy Birthday Twitter.”

⁴ *Foreign Influence Operations’ Use of Social Media Platforms: Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence*, Senate, 115th Cong, 2nd sess., September 5, 2018, <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-jdorsey-090518.pdf>

⁵ Beth Pullias (social engagement strategist, American Red Cross), discussion with the author, October 26, 2016.

the Red Cross disaster communication strategy had been to get information to people in need of help or in a position to help. The growth of social media during disaster response added a third element: getting information from people—“finding the needs in the haystack,” as former American Red Cross Director of Information Management and Situational Awareness Wendy Harman notes.⁶ These needs ranged from requests for shelter to reports of people trapped from users on the scene.⁷ The use of Twitter as part of the public sphere has endured, as more people turn to the internet for news in times of disaster, and the Red Cross has taken advantage of the technology to increase communication with volunteers, clients, and partners.

Social media can be used in disasters by humanitarian organizations to “identify needs and orient the response, gauge the scope of impact and provide info.”⁸ The Red Cross is just one of many organizations to use social media. For instance, Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) also has a strong social media presence. Paralleling the Red Cross’ response, the earthquake in Haiti was also a turning point for MSFs’ communications structure, and the organization embraced Twitter as a tool for lobbying.⁹ Seizing on the value of Twitter for its “immediacy and potential high visibility,” to reach people,

⁶ Wendy Harman (director, Information Management and Situational Awareness, Red Cross), discussion with the author, November 2, 2016.

⁷ Mercedes Bunz, “In Haiti Earthquake Coverage, Social Media Gives Victim a Voice,” *The Guardian*, January 14, 2010, www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2010/jan/14/socialnetworking-haiti.

⁸ American Red Cross, *The Case for Integrating Crisis Response with Social Media*, (Washington, DC: Blanchard, Carvin, et al, 2010), accessed August 10, 2018, <https://www.scribd.com/document/35737608/White-Paper-The-Case-for-Integrating-Crisis-Response-With-Social-Media>; Peter Landwehr and Kathleen Carley, “Social Media in Disaster Relief: Usage Patterns, Data Mining Tools, and Current Research Directions,” *Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery for Big Data*, (2014): 234.

⁹ Gerald Kane, “The American Red Cross Adding Digital volunteers to Its Ranks,” *MIT Sloan Management Review*, (May 23, 2014): 1; Lina Eidmar, “Social Media—A Possibility to Do Global Communication on a Small Budget,” *Medecins Sans Frontiers*, accessed November 3, 2018, <https://www.slideshare.net/Lina81/msf-in-social-media-during-the-haiti-emergency>, (October 2010).

MSF has continued to use Twitter, along with other tools, to inform and advocate.¹⁰

ANALYSIS

In the summer of 2010, the Red Cross organized an Emergency Social Data Summit to unite government and non-profit disaster response organizations with technology companies to develop a plan to “harness the power of new media.”¹¹ In the Summit’s white paper, the Red Cross asserted “social technologies have altered communication patterns, particularly in times of disaster.”¹² The paper also noted that societal expectations had changed, with more people using social media in disaster situations and with those users expecting timely responses.¹³

With assistance from Dell, Inc., the Red Cross launched the Digital Disaster Operations Center (the DigiDOC) in March of 2012. It ran a heat map and word cloud, monitoring topic profiles and keywords such as #RedCross and #Tornado across social media platforms.¹⁴ The DigiDOC was field tested during Hurricane Isaac and was live during Hurricane Sandy, which pummeled the United States’ Eastern Seaboard, including New York City, in October 2012. Hurricane Sandy impacted a high concentration of technologically savvy clients and was an early example of people turning to social media for assistance. Throughout the storm and its aftermath, the Red Cross used paid staff and volunteers to monitor social media—responding directly to pleas for assistance while pushing information out to communities in need.

¹⁰ Eidmar, “Social Media”

¹¹ American Red Cross, *Invitation: Emergency Social Data Summit* (2010), accessed August 10, 2018, <http://redcrosschat.org/about-the-emergency-social-data-summit>

¹² American Red Cross, *Crisis Response*, (Washington, DC. Blanchard, Carvin, et al, 2010): 1.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁴ American Red Cross, *Digital Operations Center for Humanitarian Relief*.

STRENGTHS

The strengths of the Red Cross social media program are rooted in its reach, its cutting-edge DigiDOC, and its workforce. With close to 3.5 million followers on Twitter and an average of 4000 social contacts daily, the Red Cross ranks among the top ten nonprofits using the platform.¹⁵ The Red Cross is respected, which, due to careful cultivation, holds true for @RedCross. Twitter enables the Red Cross to get real-time information that it can use to impact service.¹⁶ Twitter also serves as an alternative vehicle for the Red Cross to transmit information to communities both in need and in a position to help, 280 characters at a time. The Red Cross workforce is ninety percent volunteer staff, and staff and volunteers monitor the DigiDOC 24-7 in times of disaster.¹⁷

Since 2012, the DigiDOC has become a “part of the organization’s DNA,” as social media is used for both listening and responding to the community.¹⁸ The Red Cross uses social media to “mobilize the power of volunteers and the generosity of donors on the social web,”¹⁹ with Twitter used for sharing or gathering news.

The Red Cross initially turned to social media to engage volunteers, and while this mission now includes service in disasters, volunteers continue to be its greatest strength.²⁰ The mobile nature of Twitter combined with the national Red Cross volunteer network enables constant monitoring. This monitoring informs staff of areas of need, enables quick responses, and serves as a method of rumor control. Rumors impede response operations.

¹⁵ American Red Cross, *Social Media Handbook*, 5; “Top Nonprofits on Twitter,” accessed January 2017, topnonprofits.com/lists/top-nonprofits-on-twitter/.

¹⁶ Pullias, discussion.

¹⁷ American Red Cross, *Disaster Volunteers*, (Washington, D.C., 2018). <http://www.redcross.org/volunteer/volunteer-opportunities/disaster-volunteer>

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ American Red Cross, *Social Media Handbook*, (Washington, D.C., 2012): 9.

²⁰ Harman, discussion.

DigiDOC monitoring enables staff to flag areas of concern and tamps down rumors by distributing accurate information.

WEAKNESSES

The Red Cross has done an admirable job of embracing the technological revolution of the past decade, but issues persist. While technology has given the Red Cross new communication tools, the use of the technology is also a weakness. Twitter users tend to be young.²¹ Meanwhile, the economically distressed and elderly are particularly vulnerable in times of disaster, and this vulnerability is increased when information is disseminated on platforms they cannot or do not use. Finally, Twitter runs on the Internet, and when connectivity is weakened or the system is overloaded, information dispersed on Twitter does not reach those directly impacted by the disaster, and users cannot report their needs to the Red Cross.²²

Currently, the American Red Cross uses Twitter in English and relies on the platform's software to translate messages into other languages. The Red Cross also operates *Cruz Roja*, a Spanish language website for the American Red Cross, and, in times of disaster, local chapters with high concentrations of Spanish-speaking residents will often retweet translated messages from @RedCross, but this activity is piecemeal. To increase its reach and reduce delays in dissemination, the Red Cross will also need to increase its language capacity.²³

While the Red Cross uses people and software to monitor Twitter, these are also weaknesses of the program. Twitter is user-driven. Monitoring software is subject to human error, as a misspelled or misused keyword

²¹ American Red Cross, *Crisis Response*, 15.

²² Castillo, 129.

²³ Pullias, discussion.

might not be flagged by software or by staff.²⁴ Following the terrorist attacks at the Boston Marathon in 2013, people used multiple keywords that made events difficult to track.²⁵ Additionally, the Red Cross uses Twitter to track and respond to rumors, but rumors can run rampant on Twitter, damaging relief operations by causing confusion and delays in service.

Information on Twitter is often relevant for its “immediacy.”²⁶ The amount and impact of this data are weak links in the program. There are more than 500 million tweets daily, which increases in times of disaster. Reports from the scene help organizations know what is going on and where help is needed, but these reports can be hard to find when there is a surplus of information.²⁷ The Red Cross tracks engagement on social media via numbers of likes, mentions, and retweets, as well as through data relayed to response teams, such as requests for food to be sent to a community.²⁸ But, like many organizations, the Red Cross has yet to figure out how to track the real impact of its social media programming, as there is no data on how information from tweets impacts clients or donors.

OPPORTUNITIES

In times of disaster, Internet and social media use increased dramatically.²⁹ As Twitter grows, the reach of the Red Cross on Twitter will also grow.

²⁴ Landwehr and Carley, 18.

²⁵ Dina Fine Maron, “How Social Media Is Changing Disaster Response,” *Scientific American*, June 7, 2013, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-social-media-is-changing-disaster-response/>.

²⁶ Castillo, 79.

²⁷ Sabin, “Happy Birthday Twitter”; Dimiter Velez and Plamena Zlateva, “Use of Social Media in National Disaster Management,” *International Proceedings of Economic Development and Research* (2012): 43, www.ipedr.com/vol39/009-ICITE2012-B00019.pdf

²⁸ Pullias, discussion; American Red Cross, “Hurricane Sandy Social Media Engagement,” (Washington, D.C., December 28, 2012).

²⁹ Castillo, 19

Traditional news organizations monitor Twitter for information, and once that information is confirmed, it is reported so that non-traditional @RedCross followers, such as the elderly or non-English speakers, will also benefit.³⁰ The expansion of the network of users will enable Red Cross messaging to spread, and will also enable the Red Cross to track more viable information through Twitter.

The Red Cross is in the process of building a digital volunteer program.³¹ Digital volunteering, “the practice of performing volunteer work using digital technologies,” is a growing trend with non-profits, and enables the agency to involve volunteers beyond the scope of the disaster.³² As with all response operations, the digital volunteer program would be rooted in a local chapter. Red Cross volunteer deployments typically require travel to the scene of the disaster for three weeks at a time. The advent of digital deployments would enable volunteers to deploy for disasters without having to leave home for weeks.³³ This would expand the volunteer pool to include more technologically savvy volunteers who could be engaged both during the disaster and during non-disaster activities. There is also an opportunity for the American Red Cross to expand its social media relationship with its governing body, the International Federation of the Red Cross, through multilingual communications, and increased and coordinated messaging.

In addition to using Twitter to glean information for response activities, the Red Cross has used Twitter to engage volunteers, clients, and donors. This is a different approach from many other organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontiers, which uses Twitter for advocacy. MSF communications protocol states that Twitter “can be an important tool for exerting leverage on key stakeholders.”³⁴ During the Haiti earthquake

³⁰ Landwehr and Carley, 10.

³¹ Pullias, discussion.

³² Castillo, 96

³³ Harman, discussion.

³⁴ Médecins Sans Frontiers, *Social Media Strategy*, 25

response, MSF used Twitter to press for specific action: aid delivery. MSF tweeted at the US Air Force and others to request permission for relief planes to land or lobby for supply caravan access.³⁵ The Red Cross has used Twitter for general information gathering and dissemination, as well as volunteer, donor, and client engagement, but it has not yet used Twitter for advocacy. Without endangering foundational institutional neutrality, the Red Cross should explore how to use Twitter for public advocacy.

THREATS

The primary threat to Red Cross' continued use of Twitter is the security and financial viability of Twitter. Twitter is not consistently profitable.³⁶ If not monetized appropriately, support for the platform could fade and Twitter could go the way of MySpace or Vine. This is beyond the control of the Red Cross, but it needs to be considered. A failure of technology due to a software glitch or a hack could impede a response operation, especially if people are accustomed to using Twitter for information.³⁷ Additionally, the Red Cross must continue to work with emergency management agencies to ensure Twitter is not treated as a surrogate 911 system. Finally, if volunteers overstep their bounds or @RedCross is misused, this could damage the reputation of the Red Cross.

³⁵ Ibid., 24

³⁶ Hayley Tsukayama, "Why Twitter Is Now Profitable for the First Time Ever," *The Washington Post*, February 8, 2018, accessed August 10, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/02/08/why-twitter-is-now-profitable-for-the-first-time-ever/>

³⁷ Velev and Zlateva, 45.

FINDINGS

The Red Cross and other organizations have done an admirable job embracing technological advances in technology to increase the size and impact of the public sphere. The Red Cross has been a pioneer in its use of Twitter to disseminate information to communities in need as well as to engage with members of the community—both to provide and to request assistance. By taking advantage of its volunteer base, the Red Cross has enhanced its ability to engage via social media, but it has also opened itself up to an increased risk of human error or technological failure. To capitalize on the new media and Dorsey’s digital public square the Red Cross should seek to enhance its digital volunteer corps, increase linguistic diversity, and adopt some of the practices of other humanitarian organizations, which will require the commitment of the Red Cross to pursue digital media as a pillar of its disaster communication strategy.³⁸ In order for social media programming to thrive, the Red Cross must continue to invest in developing accessible, attractive, measurable, and multilingual social media programming as an integral part of disaster communications for communities in need of information, communities in need of help, and communities in a position to help.

³⁸ Jack Dorsey, (@jack), “We believe many people use Twitter as a digital public space,” September 5, 2018, 6:59 am, <https://twitter.com/jack/status/1037399093084151808>

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The System Is Always More than the Sum of Its Parts: Theories of Decision-Making as a Function of Human Complexity

JOSEPH TAWNEY

In this essay I intend to argue that a unified theory of international relations, foreign policy, or any other discipline, whether or not it belongs to the social sciences, must be both non-exclusionary and non-simplistic. A truly unified theory should explain and predict, and it must be capable of digesting every combination of possible inputs to produce an output that can be or will be observed in the real world. Yet no theory to date, and *potentially* no theory ever, can achieve this level of accuracy. The reason is not an inherent limitation among the researchers who develop these theories but the infinite complexity that rules our world. The characteristics and contours of this system are what makes understanding it such a tricky—if not impossible—feat. Complex systems are constantly changing, highly irreversible, subject to unpredictable variation, and sensitive to their initial conditions.

³⁹ Thus, any theory claiming to predict human behavior must be equally complex. In keeping with this theme, decision-making is one component of human behavior that is ripe for analysis, the subcomponent of which, foreign policy decision-making, will be the subject of the following essay. Within this minimally explained framework, I will provide a review of prominent theories of decision-making and discuss them in ranked order from the simplest and most exclusionary to the most complex and inclusive.

³⁹ Andrei Popa, Lecture, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, March 15, 2015.

The entire argument presented here is predicated on the rudimentary observation that there is nothing simple about the decision-making process of a human being. To capture this non-simplicity in a less abstract manner, complexity will be operationalized as the volume of input one single theory can handle. A theory that is considered complex should be able to assess the maximum number of variables (i.e. inputs) and subsequently allow for an analysis of the relationship between and among these variables. Thus, the theories presented below will be grouped into two categories. The first category of theories fail to incorporate the complexity of decision-making by reducing it to a mechanistic process. The second category successfully, albeit far from completely, reflects on these complexities.

Out of necessity, two assumptions are used to make this argument. First, the ideal theory is one that predicts, not just explains. Using this as a barometer for the efficacy of a theory, none of the following theories are sufficient. This does not mean that they are failed theories, but that they do not achieve the same level of complexity as their human subjects. Second, I assume that no human being is rational. We can attempt to act rationally, and even convince ourselves that we are rational, but our biases, our cognitive limitations, and the forces of our unconscious minds make genuine rationality a myth. With these two assumptions as the starting point, the following essay will be divided into two general parts in which two groups of theories belong. Part A theories interpret an ideal, unattainable world by explaining how things are via a rational, logical approach. Part B theories acknowledge the limited capability of humans to act rationally or logically.

PART A: A MACHINE COULD DO THIS JOB

The theories discussed in Part A are the rational actor model (RAM), bureaucratic politics model (BPM), domestic politics theory, and

diversionary theory. The first theory, RAM, is commonly discussed in foreign policy and suggests an overly simplistic interpretation of decision-making. Inspired by political realism, RAM suggests that a decision-maker's sole focus is to advance the state's national interests. RAM argues that this interest is power, defined as the state's ability to maintain its sovereignty relative to other states.⁴⁰ It proposes that decision-makers develop their policies and make decisions following a logical sequence of steps. They first determine their goals and objectives, then consider the pathways for achieving those objectives. After which, the potential consequences of each alternative is studied, followed by a selection of the most rational choice. Often these decisions are made by "historic precedent rather than abstract principle."⁴¹

The simplicity of this model speaks for itself, especially when compared to the cognitive theories in Part B. RAM is purposely divorced from a world in which irrationality exists, laying residence in a black and white universe that is devoid of subjectivity, biases, and the infinite nuances of the human experience. RAM predicts what is ideally predictable, and nothing more. Any deviations from the norm are incompatible.⁴² The authors who write about the theory, both those in favor and those offering a critique, acknowledge its myopic fallibility. Hans Morgenthau writes that a realist theory of international politics "avoids the other popular fallacy of equating the foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophical or political sympathies."⁴³ Steve Yetiv hints at the idea of cognitive limitations by illustrating that decision-makers "seek" the best possible outcome "under conditions of incomplete information," thus moving the theory away from

⁴⁰ Kenneth Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," in *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Peter L. Trubowitz, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 55.

⁴¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), 20.

⁴² Steve A. Yetiv, "The Rational Actor Model," in *Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision-Making & The Persian Gulf War* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2004), 30.

⁴³ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 25.

strict rationality to “relaxed rationality.”⁴⁴ He acknowledges the theory’s failure to consider the complexities of “risk propensity, misperception, and uncertainty.”⁴⁴ Allison and Zelikow characterize RAM as “imperfectly and one-sidedly” parochial in scope because of its innate lack of depth.⁴⁵ According to RAM, “actors seek to [make decisions] without concern for what others are expected to do,” another indication of its simplicity.⁴⁶ The vacuousness of this theory is impractical and is indicative of RAM’s highly exclusionary characteristic. The next few Part A theories incorporate more layers of complexity while still omitting human experience as an input. Unlike RAM, these theories represent an expansion in scope because they consider the decision-maker’s decisions relative to other players.

Secondly, the bureaucratic politics model (BPM) describes “state behavior that appears too irrational and/or complex” by RAM.⁴⁷ The axiom “You stand where you sit” is a common phrase used to describe BPM. This implies that decision-making is a product of the decision-maker’s position, agency, or title and not the decision-maker themselves. A representative from the State Department will champion diplomacy, while a representative from the Department of Defense may favor a more hawkish approach. The theory rescinds the decision-makers’ responsibilities by suggesting that it is impossible for them to control the “organizational web” surrounding them.⁴⁸ The government is not one individual, but rather a “conglomerate of loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own.”⁴⁵ The outputs are not the result of a deliberate cost-benefit analysis, but rather “outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.”⁴⁵ Unlike national interest being deliberated by a unified

⁴⁴ Yetiv, “The Rational Actor Model,” 32.

⁴⁵ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 2nd ed., (New York: Longman, 1999) 1-33, 77-129.

⁴⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 43.

⁴⁷ Yetiv, “The Rational Actor Model,” 121.

⁴⁸ Stephen Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland),” *Foreign Policy* 7, (1972): 159-179.

decision-maker, "multiple players holding differing conceptions of the national interest struggle, compete, and bargain over both the nature and conduct of policy."⁴⁹ Thus, the interest of the individual bureaucracies are included as points of input because "decision-makers are affected by and act as advocates for their particular bureaucracies."⁵⁰ The resulting decisions can be attributed to "conflict, confusion, bargaining, and compromise among individuals."⁵¹ One facet of the BPM that ties it closely to RAM is that the "individual players are viewed as rational," although the outcomes of their interactions are not.⁵² The BPM is more inclusive than RAM because it considers the decisions of multiple people, as well as the interactions between their opinions. The next theory expands on this by reaching outside of the government to incorporate the attitudes of the state's constituents.

The third theory of Part A is the domestic politics theory. Domestic politics theory is a broad concept that is comprised of sub-components that exhibit significant overlap. These theories are more complex and inclusive because they emphasize the will of the constituency as opposed to a state-centric focus. Domestic politics theory suggests that "generic observations of national and international affairs are somehow 'linked.'"⁵³ A "spillover" from domestic politics seeps into the field of foreign policy.⁵⁴ Yetiv comments, "Decision-makers place a high premium on domestic-level goals," especially a domestically-focused president.⁵⁵ These goals range from enhancing personal image to promoting a piece of legislation, and decision-

⁴⁹ Christopher M. Jones, "American Prewar Technology Sales to Iraq: A Bureaucratic Politics Explanation," in *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*, eds. Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 280.

⁵⁰ Yetiv, "The Rational Actor Model," 122.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 123.

⁵² *Ibid*, 123.

⁵³ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, No.3 (1988), 430.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 431.

⁵⁵ Yetiv, "The Rational Actor Model," 30.

makers “see the construction of international issues as useful” in achieving these goals.⁵⁶

Domestic opinion, therefore, plays a role in foreign policy decision-making in two ways. First, the “president can seek to ensure a close alignment between domestic opinion and their own policy preferences,” and second, “presidents respond to potential or actual gaps by adjusting policies to match public expectations.”⁵⁷ The main crux of this argument is that foreign policy decisions stem from their “domestic acceptability.”⁵⁸ Domestic politics theory introduces a new web of questions: Is it an election year? Is the country prospering economically? Is the country engaged in a war? Are the President’s approval ratings low? This last question opens the door to the next theory.

The fourth theory, diversionary theory, is the first to introduce the possibility that heads of state and bureaucracies may make decisions for reasons other than national interest, power, or their legislative priorities. Unlike the domestic politics theory, which by definition suggests that decision-making represents a reaction to internal political pressures, the diversionary theory proposes that the decision-maker acts with the purpose of steering the conversation, not responding to it. Although not explicit, one cannot apply this theory without peering into the psyche of the decision-maker. The diversionary hypothesis suggests that “presidents occasionally use force to distract the public from the president’s own domestic political troubles.”⁵⁹ The use of force abroad often inspires people to ‘rally around the flag’, which in turn has the effect of boosting the leader’s approval ratings, a useful advantage if even for a short period of time.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ David G. Skidmore, “Between Leadership and Retreat: Foreign Policy and Domestic Opinion,” *International Studies Notes* 24, No.2 (1999).

⁵⁸ Ryan Hendrickson, “Clinton’s Military Force in 1998: Diversionary Uses of Force?” *Armed Forces and Society* 28, No.2 (2002): 309-332.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

PART B: FOR HUMANS ONLY

Part B theories are more multifaceted and provide no clear line of causality between two points. The inputs refer back to the decision-makers' own unique perspective of *their* external world, where judgment is informed by biases, personal experiences, individual personalities, and cognitive limitations. Explaining and predicting human behavior from a psychological perspective, which I would argue is true realism, is a nearly impossible challenge and one that requires an infinite number of data points. The theories to be discussed in Part B attempt to account for some of these factors and include conflict theory, prospect theory, the three cognitive approaches, groupthink, and poliheuristic theory.

First, conflict theory most clearly differentiates Part A from Part B. It accepts that “human beings, programmed as they are with emotions and unconscious motives as well as cognitive abilities, seldom can approximate a state of detached affectlessness when making decisions that implicate their own vital interest of those of their organizations or nations.”⁶⁰ As robust as this sounds, the theory is lacking in substance because the only independent variable it considers is stress. The theory includes five propositions that describe the relationship between stress and decision-making, all of which seek to “specify the contrasting conditions that determine whether the stress engendered by decisional conflict will facilitate or interfere with vigilant information processing.”²² Human behavior is guided by much more than stress, and the next few theories make a greater effort to include these other variables.

Second, prospect theory describes how decision-makers behave in “high risk” situations. It suggests that “individuals tend to be risk-averse in a domain of gains, or when things are going well, and relatively risk seeking

⁶⁰ Irvin Janis, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (1977), 45-75.

in a domain of losses, like in the midst of a crisis.”⁶¹ This intuitively makes sense. ‘Losses loom larger than gains’ implies that the pain of loss is worse than the joys of gain. It is uncharacteristic for a decision-maker to part with their earnings or good fortune, especially when the chances of continued prosperity are high.⁶² Allowing for the effects of stress on the decision-making process, as detailed in conflict theory, it makes sense that judgment is clouded in precarious situations. Conflict theory and prospect theory are natural allies because “prospect theory is based on psychophysical models.”⁶³ Stress is a psychological reaction to an unpleasant environment like a high-risk situation, and the physiological release of hormones and the uptick in heart rate and blood pressure all contribute to a diminishment of cognitive abilities. Since stress affects judgment, and decisions are based on judgment, high-stress situations likely compromise sound judgment. Prospect theory allows for greater complexity than conflict theory because it allows for the establishment of a contextual foundation and discusses how it interacts with human behavior.

The next group of theories makes a concentrated effort to fully engage with the human experience. Despite their differences, they are lumped together because of one important commonality: their approach is cognitive, not rational. Human behavior is unpredictable and dependent on a myriad of factors, many of which are difficult to detect. The three theories that make up the cognitive approach try to identify and elucidate these subconscious influences. They overlap significantly, so the order in which they are presented is irrelevant. In fact, it is more useful to discuss them as one unified theory. These three sub-disciplines are: the study of heuristics and biases, the study perception and misperception, and the application of analogical thinking.

⁶¹ Rose McDermott, *Risk Taking in International Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 4.

⁶² Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 156.

⁶³ McDermott, *Risk Taking in International Politics*, 18.

The first sub-discipline I will investigate is the study of heuristics and biases, which suggests that people are incapable of seeing the world through any lens other than their own. This principle is well-known and could easily fill volumes of material. As a result of this myopic outlook, the tendency to jump to conclusions is a natural response to uncertainty. The human brain is unqualified to scrutinize every possible alternative and consequence of a decision in an objective manner. This phenomenon has been studied widely by psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.⁶⁴ They illustrated with significant probability the propensity for people to fall into the trap of their own biases and heuristics. Tversky and Kahneman write that “our predilection for causal thinking exposes us to serious mistakes in evaluating the randomness of truly random events.”¹⁴ This tendency has the adverse effect of hiding reality right before our eyes, eroding the possibility of correctly predicting the outcome of an uncertain event based on “heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.”⁶⁵ This “subjective assessment of probability” is impossibly fixed in the schema of the observer, which could be entirely different from one person to the next.⁶⁶

The second sub-discipline explores perception and misperception in cognition. Jervis argues that people’s irrationality is a product of their misperceptions, in which misperception is defined as “the gaps between the world as it actually exists and the world as it exists in the mind of the perceiver.”⁶⁷ Central to this idea is the tendency for decision-makers “...being too wedded to the established view and too closed to new information.”⁶⁸ Jervis uses the term “consistency” to describe the proclivity

⁶⁴ Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”, *Science* 185, No. 4157 (1974), 1124-1131.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Charles A. Duelfer and Stephen Benedict Dyson, “Chronic Misperception and International Conflict: The U.S.-Iraq Experience” in *International Security* 36, No. 1 (2011), 73-100.

⁶⁸ Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception” in *World Politics* 20, No. 3 (1968), 454-479.

for people to “see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images.”⁶⁹ For instance, one may be more likely to forgive their favorite celebrity for making a mistake that, had it been committed by a stranger or a person that is perceived neutrally, would otherwise be considered unforgivable. In foreign relations, this tendency can drastically alter one’s judgment, and the subsequent decision may reflect this false assumption. Another result of misperception is that “discrepant information simply is not noticed.”¹⁸ Once a decision is made it is unlikely to change, even if contradictory information is staring us right in the face. These pre-existing schemas are often born from past experiences.

The third sub-discipline, offered by Khong, argues that decision-makers frequently misuse “analogical explanations” in foreign policy.⁷⁰ An event today that appears similar to one from the past will easily convince the observer to use the past event’s outcome to guide decisions in the present. Khong argues that analogies help to “explain a new situation to use in terms we are familiar with” and “prescribe a strategy to get from ‘what is’ to ‘what ought to be,’” which “suggest[s] what is likely to occur in the future.”⁷¹ The mischaracterization arises when our misperceptions hinder the clarity needed to see the differences between the two. Our brains seek normalcy and patterns, creating the illusion that the past is repeating itself. Persistent interventions in South America during the Cold War demonstrate how decision-makers are vulnerable to analogies. American decision-makers constantly interpreted revolution in South America as the encroachment of communism, even though there were many instances in which this was not the case (consider the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état and the forced

⁶⁹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976), 117.

⁷⁰ Yuen Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 75.

⁷¹ Yuen Khong, “Seduction by Analogy in Vietnam: The Malaya and Korea Analogies,” in *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Peter L. Trubowitz, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 551-559.

deposition of Jacobo Árbenz). The methodology was to intervene and thwart the revolution, even when this approach failed. The problem is obvious. No two events are alike, and the mental shortcut that decision-makers use to compare two events can have profound effects on the outcome. All of the limitations that have been discussed so far are magnified by the next theory.

Groupthink is the third Part B theory and it describes the decision-making process as a reflection of group interactions. Once a group has formed and grown together, the cohesion of the group becomes paramount and as a result nonconformity and outside opinions are discouraged. This point is more eloquently stated in the “symptoms” of the theory. The signs of the groupthink phenomenon are an “illusion of invulnerability,” “collective rationalization,” and a “belief in inherent morality.”⁷² One manifestation of these forces is to “protect the group” through cohesion over “mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment.”⁷³ The origin of this behavior stems from the heuristics, biases, and misperceptions of the individual players. This theory is highly complex because one must consider all of the cognitive limitations that affect the single decision-maker and then apply this understanding to the group’s interactions, broadening the scope of complexity and exclusivity that can be assessed. Each player brings with him or her their own explanation of the world, and the outcome of what the group produces inevitably ends up being a mix of all of these explanations. The specific behavior and decision-making of each individual, how they interact with each other, who is accepted as a member of the “in-group” and who is expelled to the “out-group,” and how the decision reaches the ultimate decision-maker are all influenced by these forces.

⁷² Irving Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Wadsworth, 1982), 174.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

The last theory is hard to place. It does not belong at the end of the continuum, nor does it belong at the beginning. Mintz's poliheuristic theory splits the decision-making process into two stages. The decision-maker "eliminates options by the use of one or more heuristics" and the "remaining alternatives are then evaluated in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits."⁷⁴ The combination of the cognitive and rational aspects of this theory has two competing effects. It can either strengthen the theory because it accepts the cognitive approach, or it reduces the theory to rhetoric because it relies on the rational actor to make the final decision. One could argue that even the most motivated attempt to achieve rationality will fall short because of our cognitive limitations. The concepts of national interest, power, and other ostensibly rational concepts are really value-statements, subject to interpretation and cultural persuasion. Not all states agree that power is their ultimate objective, or even agree on what power is. The introduction of realism or a rational actor makes any theory less dependable for real world application.





Perhaps the construction of a truly unified theory is impossible, but the quest should not end just because it is difficult. Instead, every theory should have a place for competing ideas. No theory can stand on its own. None are capable of accounting for every possible input or every bit of randomness, uncertainty, or past experiences. The complexity of human behavior makes such a thing nearly impossible.

⁷⁴ Alex Mintz, "How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, No. 1 (2004), 3-13.

APPENDIX A

Part A

Part B



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The United States in Asia: A Guarantor of Stability or Insecure Hegemon in Relative Decline?

MAGNUS EGGEN

ABSTRACT

Contemporary U.S. security policy toward East Asia stands at a crossroad. Largely a construct of the Cold War and the post-World War II settlement, the American based security architecture now faces the new challenges of a rising China. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether the United States is playing a stabilizing role in East Asia. By discussing the impact of the U.S. presence on the stability of East Asia, this paper concludes that, through its constructive relationship with China, the United States is still a provider of stability to East Asia. However, the equilibrium between the two great powers is not perfect, and there exist hotspots that could potentially make the U.S. presence in East Asia a destabilizing rather than stabilizing one.

Ever since Commodore Perry forced Japan to open its closed country to the outside world in 1853, the United States of America has been a prominent actor in East Asia. Following the decline of the European empires and the defeat of Japan, the United States went from being one of many Western powers in the region to the only one with significant influence over its East Asia's development. As the U.S. military became responsible for enforcing the postwar settlements in East Asia, the looming threat of communism raised the priority of the region on the American security

agenda. Consequently, the United States became a permanent part of the region's security architecture.

The Cold War has come and gone. However, the role of the United States in East Asia is today discussed and legitimized in policy circles and contemporary literature as a counterbalance to the rise of China. It has thus become more critical to assess what role the United States plays and should play in Asia. Is the United States still playing a constructive role as an important pillar of stability in East Asia, or is the U.S. position a source of more insecurity among the states in the region?

The primary analytical tool for the exploration of this topic will be realism as it provides an extensive theoretical foundation to discuss the nature and conditions for international stability. Through the realist lens, three strategic alternatives are considered: (1) the impact of a hypothetical U.S. withdrawal of its military presence from East Asia, (2) the U.S. engagement as primarily offensively motivated, and (3) the U.S. engagement as primarily defensively motivated. The main argument of this paper is that given its constructive relationship with China, the United States is still a provider of stability to East Asia. However, the equilibrium between the United States and China is not perfect, and there exist hotspots that could turn the U.S. presence into a destabilizing factor rather than stabilizing one. The paper concludes that a change in policy that strengthens the U.S. role as a regional stabilizer may be in order.

WHAT IS STABILITY?

Stability means the absence of large-scale war.⁷⁵ There is an ongoing disagreement over the concept of stability within the field of international relations. On the one hand, hegemonic stability theory argues that unipolar

⁷⁵ Karl Wolfgang Deutsch and Joel David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability" in *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1964), 390.

systems are the most stable. Critics of hegemonic stability theory point out that hegemony does not equal stability since it has historically been the weaker states that are the aggressors.⁷⁶ Others argue for the inherent stability of bipolar and multi-polar orders.

Further, some argue that polarity does not matter because under the condition of anarchy any order can both be stable or unstable depending on the participating actors.⁷⁷

The United States and China are the primary security actors in East Asia, which makes the region primarily a bipolar system. The stability of the region is therefore mainly a result of the security dilemma between the two states that serve as poles of power.

A security dilemma explains the difficulty of cooperation under conditions of anarchy. For a state actor under anarchy, the dilemma will emerge to either (a) increase the military capabilities and risk setting off an arms race or (b) refrain from increasing the military capabilities and risk a potentially fatal material disadvantage in a future conflict. As a result, the consequence of the security dilemma is chronic systemic insecurity.

Within realism, there are mainly two theoretical ways to understand the dynamics of the security dilemma: an offensive and defensive approach. Offensive and defensive realism significantly diverge on the degree of determinism in the outcomes of security dilemmas. For an offensive realist, there is little an actor can do to control the mechanics of the security dilemma. Offensive realist argues that the security dilemma can be delayed from its outcome (war) by restraining factors such as geography, but the contradiction with the security dilemma cannot be solved long term. Defensive realists, on the other hand, is less deterministic and argue that

⁷⁶ Jacek Kugler, A. F. K. Organski, and Daniel J. Fox, "Deterrence and the Arms Race: The Impotence of Power" in *International Security* 4, No. 4 (1980), 105-38.

⁷⁷ Stanley Hoffmann, Robert O Keohane, and John J Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe" in *International Security* 15, No. 2 (1990), 191-99.

security dilemmas can be managed through careful strategy and actively prevented from reaching its final logical conclusion.

Consequently, the analytical outcome to be expected from the security dilemma depends on if one follows the offensive realist assumption or the assumptions of the defensive realists.⁷⁸

A WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED STATES FROM ASIA

First off, let us ask whether the best prospect for stability in East Asia is, in fact, without the United States. In this scenario, stability is preserved by avoiding the security dilemma between the United States and China entirely with a hypothetical U.S. complete withdrawal.⁷⁹ It is not unthinkable that East Asia would reach a stable balance of power at some point with the departure of all U.S. military personnel from the region. However, the short-term effects of a U.S. withdrawal would most likely be highly destabilizing. A rapid U.S. departure would leave a power vacuum, which the remaining states would compete to fill. Not only could a less restricted China and North Korea prove dangerous, but the relatively ‘pacified’ powers of Japan and South Korea which today remain dependent on both the U.S. armed forces and the navy, would have to rethink their entire security strategy.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Shiping Tang, “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions” in *International Studies Review* 10, No. 3 (2008), 451-71.

⁷⁹ David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks” in *International Security* 27, No. 4 (2003), 57-85; TJ Pempel, “More Pax, Less Americana in Asia” in *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 10, No. 3 (2010), 465-90; Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for Us Grand Strategy” in *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1997), 5-53.

⁸⁰ Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the Us-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia” in *International Security* 23, No. 4 (1999), 49-80; Victor D. Cha, “The Rationale for Enhanced Engagement of North Korea: After the Perry Policy Review” in *Asian Survey* 39, No. 6 (1999), 845-66.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE REALISM AND THE U.S-CHINA SECURITY DILEMMA

Offensive realist authors such as John J. Mearsheimer view the U.S. presence in Asia as a result of its wish to deny China's regional hegemony.⁸¹ The utmost strategic concern of the United States is to prevent both sides of the Eurasian continent from being dominated by 'hostile' powers. A hostile Eurasia would have severe consequences for the U.S. security.⁸² China, on the other hand, has an equally valid security rationale behind its increased regional assertiveness. States ultimately seek security, and regional hegemony is the only way China can achieve absolute security. As a result, China is on a collision course with the United States in its quest to achieve its security interests, causing a security dilemma, which cannot be solved long term.

Defensive realists, in contrast, make different judgments about what outcomes the current great power rivalry in East Asia where they downplay states' desire to seek hegemony and emphasize that historically bipolarity has been relatively peaceful.⁸³ The balance of power between the two great powers will deter aggression and be the foundation of a stable order in Asia.⁸⁴ The geography of the region also plays an important part for why the tragedies of the European history will not occur in East Asia. Robert Ross, for example, argues that East Asian geography is roughly divided into a zone characterized by water dominated by the United States and a zone

⁸¹ John J. Mearsheimer, "Can China Rise Peacefully?" in *The National Interest* 25 (2014), 23-37.

⁸² Aaron L. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, WW Norton & Company (2011), 6-7.

⁸³ Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, *International Relations Theories* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 81-86.

⁸⁴ Shiping Tang, *A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism* (Springer, 2010); Friedberg, "The Future of Us-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?" in *International Security* 30, No. 2 (2005), 24-29.

characterized by landmass.⁸⁵ In Asia, the United States possesses naval superiority but cannot project power on land. China, on the other hand, is dominant on land but is still very inferior regarding sea power.⁸⁶ Therefore, the ability of either great power successfully to interfere in each other's 'natural' sphere of influence reinforces the stability of the bipolar order and the status quo.

PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM

Both defensive and offensive realism makes strong cases for what role the United States plays in Asia. As a result, within the realist paradigm, the answer to the future of U.S.-China relations must come down to how we understand the actors involved. After all, different schools of thought and political faction which argue for competing visions of foreign policy strategy exist within both the U.S. and China.⁸⁷ The inclusion of a domestic level of analysis sheds light on the seemingly competing narrative of U.S.-China relations, which is characterized by competition on the one hand and cooperation the other.

A dive into the history of U.S.-China relations shows a more benign narrative at play. During the 1990s, the U.S.'s main priority towards China was to make the rising power a 'responsible stakeholder' in the international system and is still a significant characteristic of their relationship.⁸⁸ Further, the U.S. has participated in creating webs of economic and institutional

⁸⁵ Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century" in *International Security* 23, No. 4 (1999), 81-118.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 97-106.

⁸⁷ Posen, *Competing Visions for Us Grand Strategy*; David Shambaugh, "Coping with a Conflicted China" in *The Washington Quarterly*, No. 1 (2011), 7-27.

⁸⁸ Friedberg, "The Future of Us-China Relations," 90-95; Friedberg, *Contest for Supremacy*, 112-115.

interdependence in the region, which has made all sides benefit from the status quo.⁸⁹

China, on the other hand, has overall reacted positively to U.S. initiatives towards accommodating its rise to prominence. Johnston points out using a stricter definition of what a status quo power is, concludes that China is largely willing to “*play by the rules of the game.*”⁹⁰ This argument can be viewed in connections with Yan Xuetong’s sobering explanation of China’s newly found ‘assertiveness.’⁹¹ Yan emphasizes that China, now more willing to wield its power, is not seeking directly to challenge the U.S. Instead, he argues, “*China wants to be respected and seeks of healthy and peaceful competition with the U.S.*”⁹² If healthy competition between the U.S. and China indeed becomes the future of East Asia with both actors actively engaging, but at the same time keeping each other militarily in check, the bipolar stability of the region is likely to continue.

Despite the reasons for optimism one of the defining aspects, which may impact the outcomes of the security dilemma between the U.S. and China, is the role of fear.⁹³ Both of the great powers have shown an ability to act benign, which reduce the risk that the bleak predictions of the offensive realists. Nonetheless, there are some negative trends regarding identity creation between the two states, which may that push states towards the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy of realism’.⁹⁴

The role of fear and suspicion between states can impact the domestic dynamics of the state actor. A dynamic which in turn affects the relationship

⁸⁹ Sohn Byeong-hae, “Towards a New Regionalism in East Asia” in *Journal of Economic Integration* (2004), 499-518; Pempel, “More Pax Less Americana,” 472-473.

⁹⁰ Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” in *International Security* 27, No. 4 (2003), 5-56.

⁹¹ Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement” in *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* (2014).

⁹² *Ibid.*, 171-172.

⁹³ Tang, *Fear in International Politics*.

⁹⁴ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 368.

between state competitors as ‘hawks’ on both sides get more power of definition in the domestic security discourse. An increased role of fear means foreign policy hawks in China as well as in the U.S. will legitimize each other’s existence, as they argue for the necessity of their policies in a tit-for-tat process of escalation. An arguably clear example of such a process is how former national security advisor Steve Bannon, who expects a war between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea “in five to 10 years”, came from obscurity to becoming a temporarily significant figure in American politics.⁹⁵ On the Chinese side, as shown by Quek and Johnston, the Chinese public is today highly likely to demand escalation from their government, over a territorial dispute, if the U.S. threatens to intervene.⁹⁶

These trends may indicate that the notion of fear will play a larger role in the security dilemma between the U.S. and China in the future. With its vocal complaints about American trade deficits with China, the escalating trade war and accusation of Chinese dual motives in containing North Korea, the Trump administration surely indicates that the mechanics of fear and suspicion are well underway. In response, Beijing under the newly elevated leadership of Xi Jinping shows little interest of backing down from its assertive claims and Taiwanese independence.⁹⁷

Taiwan is an example of a core ideational issue where U.S. identity as a defender of democracy and China’s wish for ‘national rejuvenation’ are entirely at odds.⁹⁸ The trade dispute can resolve itself with change in policy, but the future of Taiwan is a core issue for everyone involved. Could Taiwan

⁹⁵ Benjamin Herscovitch, “A Balanced Threat Assessment: China’s South China Sea Policy” in *The Cato Institute: Policy Analysis* No. 280 (2017), 4.

⁹⁶ Kai Quek and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Can China Back Down?” in *International Security* 42, no 3 (2017), 25.

⁹⁷ Richard Bush, “What Xi Jinping said about Taiwan at the 19th Party Congress,” *Brookings* (2017).

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/19/what-xi-jinping-said-about-taiwan-at-the-19th-party-congress/>.

⁹⁸ Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior—Part One: On ‘Core Interests’” in *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 22 (2011), 5-8.

be a jumping off point to where the major powers start to understand each other with the “worst possible intentions” in mind?⁹⁹

In the case of Taiwan, there is thus a reason for pessimism. Consequently, it is reasonable to argue, if the U.S. is serious about the sustainability of its presence in Asia, concessions over Taiwan would be a great place to start. The U.S. could stop selling high-tech weaponry to Taiwan or start rolling back its role as the security guarantee for the islands’ de-facto independence. Potentially, such a move would both rob the hawks of some of their most powerful political ammunition and lead to Chinese goodwill, which could be used in other parts of U.S. Asia policy. Partial or total American neglect would not be a death sentence for Taiwan either. Even without American support, O’Hanlon and later strongly emphasized by Beckley have argued that a mainland invasion would be extremely difficult and is very unlikely to succeed.¹⁰⁰

The point is that Taiwan exemplifies that alternatives exist to vehemently maintaining primarily the Cold War security architecture, which still defines the U.S. presence in East Asia.¹⁰¹ As Kissinger noted on U.S. deterrence in 1968, that there is a fine balance to be maintained between “*being ashamed of power and expecting too much of it*”.¹⁰² Washington cannot turn back the clock and should take concrete steps to ensure the stability of its relationship with Beijing. Now more important than ever, U.S. foreign policy towards China for the remainder of the 21st century must be restrained but remain resolved if it wants to continue as a guarantor of stability in East Asia.

⁹⁹ Tang, *Fear in International Politics*, 451.

¹⁰⁰ Michael Beckley, “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion” in *International Security* 42 (2017), 83-94; Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan” in *International Security* 25, No. 2 (2000), 51-86.

¹⁰¹ Eric Gomez, “A Costly Commitment: Options for the future of U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship” in *The Cato Institute: Policy Analysis* No. 800 (2016).

¹⁰² Niall Fergusson, *Kissinger 1923-1968: The Idealist* (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 838.

CONCLUSION

The stability of East Asia depends on the outcome of the security dilemma between the U.S. and China. Since both great powers show clear traits to be benign about each other, it is likely that their security dilemma will not deteriorate and, for now, stability is still preserved. However, though the U.S. positions in East Asia provide stability to the region, it is not inhibiting the ultimate position for sustainable relations. If the U.S. wants to continue to provide stability to the region regardless of its relative decline, it must reassess some of its positions in favor of China, while reaffirming its position on others. If the U.S. does so, the healthy competition and stability of the bipolar in Asia have a solid chance to continue.

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Special Preview: *Mortal Doubt: Transnational Gangs and Social Order in Guatemala City*

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ABSTRACT

Twenty years since the end of Central America's longest and bloodiest civil war, Guatemala City is dominated by both the fact and fear of out-of-control crime. In powerful, haunting prose, *Mortal Doubt* takes readers inside the making of this new order of violence through the evolution of its most infamous emissary: the *maras*, or transnational gangs. While *maras* are widely blamed for the rise of peacetime crime, Anthony W. Fontes argues that they have in fact become key figures through which both Guatemalan and global society prop up a sense of order in the face of overwhelming uncertainties about the cause and meaning of so much violence. Through histories of war and peace out of which the *maras* emerge, into the porous prisons and illicit businesses in which they operate, and out through the brutal spectacles that draw gangs into the global imagination, *Mortal Doubt* traces how *maras'* flesh and blood violence has become indissoluble from their symbolic power in social imaginaries, giving cover to a host of actors feeding and feeding off peacetime insecurity. To convey the consequences of the struggle to make sense of senseless suffering, Fontes weaves fantasy and reality together in ways that cannot always be pulled apart, and the doubled image of the gangster who walks the city streets and the gangster infesting strung out imaginations blend and merge.

This figure, in turn, provides a lens through which to witness the making and mooring of collective terror in Guatemala City and beyond.

Mortal Doubt is available now from University of California Press.

Contrasting, Constructing, and Confirming Realities of Immigration

KATE SCHAEFER

“[Mexico] has been overtaken by lawbreakers from the bottom to the top. And now, what you’re protesting for is to have lawbreakers come here.”
Glenn Beck, Mar. 27, 2006

“Our journey is not complete until we find a better way to welcome the striving, hopeful immigrants who still see America as a land of opportunity, until bright young students and engineers are enlisted in our workforce rather than expelled from our country.”
Barack Obama, Jan. 21, 2013

INTRODUCTION

Today’s global refugee crisis has spurred American antagonism towards immigration, with even the most vulnerable refugees targeted with fear and bigotry. Economists and policy experts alike argue that immigration provides many benefits to the US through labor, taxes, business innovation and development.¹⁰³ In fact, immigrants offer dynamic contributions to the social fabric of the new nations they call home.¹⁰⁴ So why then are they met with such resistance? Where do these fears come from? What measures lead some to welcome their presence, and others to demean their journey, or worse, suggest they are perpetrators of violence?

¹⁰³ Jean-Christophe Dumont and Thomas Liebig, “Is Migration Good for the Economy?” *OECD*, May 2014.

¹⁰⁴ Darrell M. West, *Brain Gain: Rethinking U.S. Immigration Policy* (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2006).

There are three frameworks that shed light on this contradiction: the theory of information, the role of emotion in narrative, and the ritual model of communication. First, the theory of information overload explains how people can believe contradictory realities. Second, Marshall Ganz's and Drew Westen's analyses of the role of emotion in narrative illustrate why people gravitate towards certain perspectives. Finally, the ritual model of communication shows how people choose among different sources of information to confirm their own espoused reality, which further exacerbates differences between knowledges. Together, these theories suggest that people who already hold strong views on immigration are difficult to persuade once they develop and reaffirm their views through exposure to political and media rhetoric.¹⁰⁵

CONTRASTING REALITIES

Americans are deeply divided in their views of immigration. A 2016 Pew Research Center poll found that 59 percent of Americans had a favorable view of immigration, while 33 percent viewed immigration negatively.¹⁰⁶ According to Pew, views on immigration have improved overall since 1994, when 63 percent of Americans saw immigrants as a burden on the country

¹⁰⁵ No essay is written, no research conducted, in a void. Biases always color narratives; let me then share my own perspective in order to allow the reader to view this analysis in the necessary frame. My views on immigration are strongly positive. Having grown up in a multicultural environment and having dedicated myself to traveling and learning about other cultures, I believe that legitimizing myriad voices strengthens a nation and an individual. As one might expect from that issue, I hold generally liberal views and subscribe to media that, though relatively fair, reflects those views, including NPR, the BBC, Vox, *Slate*, *The Economist*, and so forth. I try to balance my input at least a little by occasionally reading *The Wall Street Journal*, but its effects are probably limited at best.

¹⁰⁶ Bradley Jones, "Americans' Views of Immigrants Marked by Widening Partisan, Generational Divides," Pew Research Center, April 15, 2016. Researchers asked survey participants which of two statements corresponded most closely to their own views: that immigrants "strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents" or that they "are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health care".

and only 31 percent viewed them favorably. But since 2006 differences have deepened, especially between the opinions of Democrats and Republicans. Of those who held positive views on immigration in the 2016 poll, an astonishing 78 percent identified themselves as Democrats. The 2016 presidential campaign only exacerbated those differences. In March of 2016, 17 percent of Clinton supporters thought immigrants were a burden on the US, while 69 percent of Trump proponents said the same.¹⁰⁷ These divergent views on immigration are formed and confirmed through emotional narratives in media and political rhetoric.

Stories on immigration abound with competing narratives. In the information age, obtaining comprehensive information on an issue takes both time and effort. With so many sources offering biased or competing information, it becomes difficult to know when the narrative matches fact. For this reason, citizens often gravitate towards information that fulfills their own worldview rather than seeking out contradictory narratives. Economists describe this acceptance of narratives at face value as part of *rational ignorance*. In other words, if the cost of educating oneself outweighs the benefit of obtaining deeper or more accurate information, then it is rational to simply ignore contradictory inputs. The sheer quantity of information available on the Internet certainly makes comprehending all information on even one issue impossible. Lankshear, Peters, and Knobel describe this “superabundance of information” as “info-glut” or “data smog.”¹⁰⁸ Because this information is unfiltered, customizable, and presented, they urge users to exercise caution in evaluating its credibility. No external entity ensures that information on the internet is factual; determining a source’s accuracy is left up to the user alone, which can be a

¹⁰⁷ “Campaign Exposes Fissures Over Issues, Values and How Life Has Changed in the U.S.,” Pew Research Center, March 31, 2016.

¹⁰⁸ Colin Lankshear, Michael Peters, and Michele Knobel, “Information, Knowledge and Learning: Some Issues Facing Epistemology and Education in a Digital Age,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 34 (2000): 1, 26-27.

challenge when there is so much data to sort through. This data smog leads not only to difficulties in assessing credibility, but also to competition for attention.

The plethora of information available creates incentives for individuals as well as media organizations to strive for “endless originality” in order to garner maximum attention by the consumer, especially in a profit-making media industry.¹⁰⁹ Information thrives in abundance, but attention is inherently scarce, Lankshear et al. explain. As a result, when basic needs are met, economic activity shifts towards capturing attention for profit.¹¹⁰ In the US today, as politics have become more polarized; so has the media. Opinion leaders in both the media and the political sphere present views that reflect and create the perspectives of their audiences. Narratives that match what a person already believes are more appealing to those people. Combined with information overload, this means (perhaps not surprisingly) that “media choices increasingly reflect partisan considerations.”¹¹¹

In an attention economy, actors such as government leaders can capture the public’s attention by presenting views that cater to their constituencies. Rather than paying with money, consumers quite literally pay their attention to these leaders and the news media that report on them. This environment also fuels the economic incentive for media organizations to target their news to specific views, which in turn gives politicians an electoral incentive to focus their rhetoric. Media organizations and political leaders that earn the most attention are generally the most successful. At the same time, with the quantity of information available, when people “buy” certain sources with their attention, they do not necessarily have the capacity to learn about other perspectives. Instead, they devote their attention to people and organizations advocating the views they already hold. These actors then

¹⁰⁹ Michael H. Goldhaber, in Lankshear et al., “Information, Knowledge and Learning,” 32.

¹¹⁰ Lankshear et al., “Information, Knowledge and Learning,” 33.

¹¹¹ Shanto Iyengar and Kyu S. Hahn, “Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use,” *Journal of Communication* 59 (2009), 20.

have a further incentive to tailor their content and rhetoric even more, deepening the cycle of polarization. The more the public focuses on stories that match its own perceived reality, the deeper the divisions become between these realities and that of the public media.

Understanding the attention economy highlights why individuals gravitate towards certain sources, but how do they form their views in the first place? What makes some people focus on positive aspects of immigration and others on the negative? Discussions of emotion and narrative illustrate how people act on emotions that are constructed through narrative.

CONSTRUCTING REALITIES

According to public policy expert Marshall Ganz, narratives forge an emotional connection between a person and an idea. Through narrative, people experience emotions that can motivate or inhibit action. These emotions move people towards what Ganz describes as *public narrative*: a way to link “self, us, and now” to inspire action.¹¹² Organizations and individuals can use public narrative to inspire action on an issue by creating an emotional connection between an individual (the self), a group (the us), and an initiative (the now). As scholar Drew Westen argues, emotions are the basis for human motivation.¹¹³ Through principles of evolution, behavioral psychology, and psychoanalysis, Westen explains how people are attracted to things that make them feel good, and are repelled from things that make them feel bad. He infers that behavior can be altered if

¹¹² Marshall Ganz, “Public Narrative, Collective Action, and Power,” in *Accountability through Public Opinion: From Inertia to Public Action*, ed. Sina Odugbemi and Taeku Lee (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), 274.

¹¹³ Westen, Drew, “The Emotion Behind the Curtain,” in *The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).

communicators elicit specific emotions. Ganz shows how leaders can use narrative to reconstruct reality around motivating emotions such as hope and solidarity, and can overcome emotions like apathy and doubt, which inhibit action.

Ganz and Westen's theories show how leaders in politics and the media have the means to choose which emotions to engage and which to dampen. By selectively reporting information infused with imagery or rhetoric, they can raise or diminish fears about immigrants, regardless of the facts. For example, politicians and the media often employ rhetoric that suggests immigrants depress wages and steal jobs, which instills fear among the public. They can also use rhetoric to conjure positive feelings surrounding immigrants, such as their contribution to cultural diversity and innovation. In appealing to different emotions, these narratives inspire different actions or inaction.

The narrative surrounding immigration as a result of leader and media bias has shifted throughout history. The idea of the US as a "nation of immigrants" became widely accepted only in the 1960s—and even then, "immigrants" referred to the waves of European arrivals.¹¹⁴ Conflicting immigration narratives suggest an ambivalent attitude toward immigrants; the idea of accepting "your tired, your poor," as famously enshrined on the Statue of Liberty, contrasts with negative media and the political rhetoric surrounding successive waves of German, Italian, Irish, East Asian, and Mexican immigrants. Clearly, different groups of immigrants experience different receptions at different times in American history. These shifts in attitudes result in part from a change in narrative.

In the past and today, public narrative is central to establishing attitudes and inspiring action. For Ganz, public narrative encompasses a story of self, us, and now that is reflected in discourse on both sides of the aisle. From

¹¹⁴ J.M. Kotowski, "Narratives of Immigration and National Identity: Findings from a Discourse Analysis of German and U.S. Social Studies Textbooks." *Stud Ethn Nation* 13 (2013).

Republican leaders and Fox News, a story emerges of immigrants who threaten American jobs and values, where “us” comprises (white) Americans. Their public narrative uses fear and anger to mobilize their audience. On the Democratic side, political and media rhetoric celebrates diversity and innovation, calling forth the motivating emotions of hope and solidarity. Their audience responds to these narratives by welcoming immigrants.

Based on the analyses of Ganz and Westen, one would expect that when competing narratives exist, people determine the facts of the issue and rally behind whichever idea they find to be most accurate. Unfortunately, reality fails to live up to this ideal. The ritual model of communication explains, to some extent, why people split between competing realities.

CONFIRMING REALITIES

The ritual model of communication treats communication not just as a means of passing information, but as a way of establishing and confirming one’s place within a group. Historically, communication scholars have used the transmission model to describe communication. In the transmission model, the sender encodes a message into some medium, such as writing or speaking. The message reaches the receiver, who decodes the message. The ritual model differs from this more standard transmission model in that the ritual model views communication as a means of maintaining society rather than as an extension of messages in space. In the ritual model, instead of passing on information, communication serves as a way of confirming an individual’s place in the world through the creation of a symbolic order that constructs and reaffirms a social process.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ James W. Carey, “A Cultural Approach to Communication,” in *Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 18-19.

Communications scholar James Carey uses the example of a newspaper to contrast the transmission and ritual models of communication, a particularly relevant issue for examining attitudes toward immigration. Carey says that in the transmission view, the newspaper disseminates information to the public “in larger and larger packages over greater distances.”¹¹⁶ In other words, more information gets to people who are farther and farther away. This example depicts people as blank slates, waiting to observe whatever information comes their way. But experience shows that this is not the case: people always apply their own interpretations – from “unquestionably true” to “fake news” – to information they receive. Further, sensationalism, bias, and selective exposure get in the way of pure sharing of information. As an alternative, Carey presents the ritual perspective on newspapers as tools of communication. Newspapers are “dramatically satisfying, which is not to say pleasing, presentations of what the world at root is.”¹¹⁷ As such, they confirm people’s views of society.

As news distribution fragments along ideological lines, newspapers and other sources of news help construct and reaffirm those divisions. Selective exposure and confirmation bias leads people to choose and believe those sources that confirm their reality. And on the Internet, where far more news options exist than anyone could ever read, selective exposure can be as much a defense against information overload as a deliberate narrowing of perspective. Yet the effect is the same—people gravitate towards the outlets that share their view of the world.

¹¹⁶ Carey, “A Cultural Approach to Communication,” 20.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 21.

CONCLUSION

The concepts of information overload, emotion and narrative, and ritual communication explain various aspects of public attitudes toward immigration. First, due to information overload, no individual can comprehend all of the information and perspectives on even a minor issue, let alone one as complex as immigration. Second, the idea of public narrative shows that rather than relying on data to inform their opinions, the emotion that people associate with immigrants as a result of media and political rhetoric dictates their views on immigration. People who believe immigration leads to dynamism and cultural growth welcome immigrants, while those who see immigrants as a threat to their jobs and even their lives, abhor them. Finally, the ritual model of communication shows how people confirm these beliefs by choosing sources of information that conform to their views about the world. Taken together, these themes provide a lens through which to examine divergent immigration attitudes among Americans.

The possibilities for shifting attitudes seem bleak, although Ganz's public narrative offers a glimmer of hope. By appealing to different emotions—curiosity rather than fear, for instance— opinion leaders may be able to develop consensus around more humanizing opinions of immigration. But such a consensus among individuals would first require a consensus among opinion leaders, an unlikely proposition in today's media and political environment.

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Slipping Through the Cracks: Development of Police Function in Post-Conflict States

JONATHAN D. POWERS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recent research has demonstrated that cessation of hostilities in civil conflicts has at best a limited impact on Rule of Law (ROL) improvements in the medium term, and that pre-conflict ROL indicators are the best predictors of post-conflict ROL status.¹¹⁸ This analysis suggests that post-conflict ROL programs generally fail in strengthening the rule of law in post-conflict states. The purpose of this paper is to analyze one potential contributing factor to failed ROL programs: the inability to develop a credible and efficient police *function* in a post-conflict state. Additionally, this paper will argue that the frequent treatment of police reform as an element of Security Sector Reform (SSR) by donors, often focusing on the need for traditional security over the need for human security, may be a causal factor in the lack of the development of police functions in many post-conflict states.

Donor coordination issues, such as conflicting objectives among major intervening nations, have long plagued SSR and ROL development in post-conflict states and have led to misaligned strategies, weak institutions, and counterproductive results. This paper will examine the issue of donor

¹¹⁸ Stephan Haggard and Lydia Tiede, "The Rule of Law in Post Conflict Settings: The Empirical Record," *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (2014): 406.

coordination in SSR and ROL development, with a specific focus on the creation of credible and competent police functions via three qualitative case studies (Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone). Donor approaches to SSR and ROL, along with the unique role of police forces in a post-conflict state, have left policing functions (although not necessarily police forces) highly underdeveloped. The paper will begin with a brief review of SSR and ROL concepts, again with a focus on police functions and forces, and the overall role they play in post-conflict transitions. Next, this paper discusses the many donor coordination issues impacting SSR and ROL and the strengthening of post-conflict police forces. Finally, the paper will review the three previously-mentioned cases to qualitatively analyze and demonstrate the inherent issues in establishing a credible police function with current SSR and ROL donor techniques.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM, RULE OF LAW, & POLICE FORCES

A cursory review of ROL and SSR concepts is necessary to highlight the unique role that police forces play in both programs, despite frequently only being handled as part of the SSR process by many donors and intervention forces. According to the Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD), SSR is a vital international concern and necessary for successfully transitioning out of conflict and achieving the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals.¹¹⁹ Much of the academic and policy focus in SSR has shifted in recent years away from a sole focus on state security towards a more holistic concept of human security that includes establishing and maintaining the well-being of citizens, including basic safety and security as well as building trust in state institutions and the law.

¹¹⁹ OECD, *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (OECD, 2008), 20.

While military forces and intelligence services are largely designed to protect the state, theoretically only police forces are exclusively dedicated to safeguarding citizens and their rights, a critical factor in enhancing human security within a post-conflict state. The OECD handbook specifically stipulates that “police should have the primary responsibility for internal security,” although this principle becomes problematic in instances of lingering violence from an internal conflict.¹²⁰ The United Nations, which has also created a handbook for SSR implementation, has outlined the clear necessity for police forces in post-conflict states to serve separate and distinct functions from the military, a critical point of departure for successful SSR planning and implementation.¹²¹ Police in particular serve as the most visible representatives of the government to the people. Effective police work demonstrates effective and responsive governance, an important factor in establishing government legitimacy and preventing a slide back towards open conflict.¹²²

ROL development is central to many post-conflict transitions as well, as it is tied to the most basic concepts of liberal democracy often used by the United Nations. Therefore is a central requirement of most intervening forces and donor countries when supporting post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. ROL development, although not focused on state security in the traditional sense, is highly involved with the creation and maintenance of human security within a state, i.e. the establishment and protection of basic citizen rights. ROL - being governance by laws and leaders - requires an accepted legal code, judicial institutions, government oversight (checks and balances), and police forces to investigate and enforce the legal code.¹²³

¹²⁰ OECD, 22.

¹²¹ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* (UN, 2003), 88.

¹²² David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito, *The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism and Violent Crime* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 16.

¹²³ Haggard, 407.

Police forces, despite being dealt with via SSR programs by intervening forces and donors, are often the most visible element of the rule of law in the eyes of the public. This intersection of roles and responsibilities places police forces in a unique situation in post-conflict states as they are generally developed as part of SSR efforts, although classic police functions, such as enforcement and daily protection, arguably are more critical to ROL development.

DONOR COORDINATION AND POLICE REFORM

As the pace of the United Nations (UN) and other intergovernmental organization's humanitarian, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts have intensified, donor coordination issues have received substantial academic attention over the past two decades . Post-conflict donor resources - such as funds, equipment, and personnel - aimed at developing liberal democracy and preventing a slide back into conflict are often heavily directed at SSR and ROL. While donors generally approach SSR as a process which explicitly includes police reform, SSR in practice remains heavily directed at security in the traditional sense of the concept, i.e. securing the government and territorial borders against enemies of the state. As a result, police reform efforts undertaken as a component of SSR programs can often be contradictory, developing police *forces* but not necessarily police *functions*.

Donor coordination issues can also disconnect reform areas that are critical to police work - such as training, equipping, facilities, recruitment policies, oversight and judicial competency - undermining efforts at police reform. Donor efforts specifically designed to develop ROL often focus on legal codes and the judiciary, with relatively minimal attention dedicated to police forces and police functions. Consequently, the development of police *functions*, not necessarily police *forces* 'slips through the cracks' as security-focused programs and donors develop police forces in less than ideal

security situations to address traditional security concerns. Similarly, ROL-focused programs, which most critically require traditional police functions for success, have little to no involvement with police force reform and development.




Figure 1. Police Reform Coordination Issues between SSR and ROL programs & donors

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Afghanistan (2001)

In Afghanistan, a state which desperately needed both SSR and ROL development, various donors - primarily the United States and Germany - were tasked with SSR. Following widely accepted SSR procedures, these donors undertook police reform as part of their wider security reform programs. As Cornelius Friesendorf highlighted in his work on SSR in

Afghanistan, donor coordination issues undermined the creation of a credible police function, creating a series of paramilitarized police forces with little to no traditional policing apparatus.¹²⁴

The development of police forces primarily as security providers, as happened in Afghanistan, violates one of the core principles of SSR and police reform according to UN, OECD, and Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) policies, but is not an uncommon occurrence in post-conflict states.¹²⁵ In the case of Afghanistan, the United States placed primacy on the need for the traditional concept of security in their war with the Taliban despite policies and research advocating against such a heavy emphasis on security to the detriment of other facets of development. The US contribution of resources designated for police reform as part of SSR created several additional militarized security forces (Afghan National Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police, Border Police) in an effort to fill security gaps, to the long-term detriment of civilian policing, human security, and legitimacy building.¹²⁶ In stark contrast, many European donor resources in Afghanistan, small in size relative to US contributions, were used to promote traditional police work.¹²⁷ Ultimately, resources were wasted, there was confusion about the division of labor, and there was no effective police function. The ROL development programs, also severely needed in Afghanistan but largely isolated from SSR programs, had little voice in the development of police forces. As a result, ROL programs suffered with no effective and formal policing mechanisms in place to enforce the rule of law.

¹²⁴ Cornelius Friesendorf, "Paramilitarization and Security Sector Reform: The Afghan National Police," *International Peacekeeping* 18, No. 1 (2011): 80.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 80.

¹²⁶ Robert M. Perito, "Afghanistan's Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform," *United States Institute of Peace Special Report* (2009): 4.

¹²⁷ Friesendorf, 83.

Mozambique

The UN Peacekeeping Mission in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), and later the UN Development Program, managed an SSR program in the country starting in the early 1990s at the request of several European donor states, and faced many similar problems related to police reform. The UN, acting solely as a program coordinator for SSR efforts, was forced to deal with a Mozambique which had largely demilitarized its defense forces with the support of Swiss DDR funding. As a result of a large military demobilization, the government of Mozambique, which still had critical security concerns, redirected military equipment and personnel into the police forces as part of the SSR program.¹²⁸ UNOMOZ included a small civilian police training team, but the militarization and security focus of the Mozambique police force proved to be too large of a scale for the team that was well beyond their operational capacity.¹²⁹

Judicial reforms were a significant effort of the ROL program in Mozambique following the civil war. Although these reforms had many obstacles and failures in their own right, a recurring issue plaguing the legal process and ROL program was the inability of police forces to provide adequate evidence and case work to prosecute citizens charged with crimes under the reformed legal code and judicial processes, a dilemma at least partially attributable to the security focused nature of the reformed police.¹³⁰ Afghanistan and Mozambique fell into the same trap, with an overemphasis on security by donors and officials undertaking SSR programs, and ROL programs isolated from the development of police forces and functions. The end result again included heavily militarized police forces focused on

¹²⁸ Mark Malan, "Peacebuilding in Southern Africa: Police Reform in Mozambique and South Africa," *International Peacekeeping* 6, No. 4 (2007): 175.

¹²⁹ Anicia Lala and Laudemiro Francisco, "The Difficulties of Donor Coordination: Police and Judicial Reform in Mozambique," *Civil Wars* 8, No. 2 (2006): 166.

¹³⁰ Lala, 171.

security actions with little to no capacity to fill traditional police functions, ultimately contributing to a diminished rule of law.

Sierra Leone (1991)

The civil war and post-civil war environment in Sierra Leone provides an informative example of an arguably more successful police reform effort. In Afghanistan and Mozambique, police forces were developed in name only from the beginning of SSR programs, with minimal capacity for traditional police functions as a result of the donor practice of undertaking police reform as part of SSR and a general overemphasis on traditional security development to the detriment of traditional police functions. In Sierra Leone the opportunity for this same trap existed, and, as Erlend Krogstad states in his work on Sierra Leone, the post conflict environment in Sierra Leone illustrated how “conflicting agendas of intervention such as democratization and counterinsurgency play out in the field of policing.”¹³¹ The UK, serving as the sole donor working on police reform in post-civil war Sierra Leone, initially deviated from the common SSR approach that was used in Afghanistan and Mozambique. Instead of reforming police as part of a larger effort to improve security, the UK approached police reform as an economic development project necessary to attract foreign investments and create a suitable environment for business.¹³² More closely related to ROL than SSR, the police reform program in Sierra Leone showed promise, until massive attacks by competing military groups within Sierra Leone forced British policy to adjust and reform the police forces along paramilitary lines in order to establish necessary security, to the detriment of the rule of law in the country.

¹³¹ Erlend Groner Krogstad, “Security, Development and Force: Revisiting Police Reform in Sierra Leone,” *African Affairs* 111, No. 443 (2012): 262.

¹³² Joseph P. Chris Charley and Freida Ibaduni M’Cormack, “A Force for Good? Police Reform in Post Conflict Sierra Leone,” *Institute of Development Bulletin* 43, No. 4 (2012): 51.

The situation in Sierra Leone shows the critical nature of security reform in supporting traditional police functions. The UK, extracting police reform from the SSR framework and building a police force more aligned with ROL objectives, may well have established an enhanced rule of law in the country had the state's lack of effective security apparatuses not forced the police into a state security role. As can be seen in this example, while the treatment of police reform as an element of security reform can undermine ROL programs, it is an impossible trap to avoid without a supportive state security apparatus that enables police forces to focus on police functions, not security work.

CONCLUSION

As has been demonstrated in the previous case studies, the treatment of police reform as an element of SSR creates inherent problems, including the tendency to overemphasize security and create paramilitary police forces. This militarization of police often contributes to insecurity, to the detriment of traditional police function development and consequently to the ROL. Donors and intervention forces, often isolated into different lines of operation (such as ROL and SSR) are unable to coordinate effectively, resulting in police forces suited to security needs and not to police functions. This brief qualitative review of three post-conflict police reform cases does not claim to conclusively demonstrate causal links between donor behavior in regards to police reform and ROL underdevelopment or failure, but rather aims to highlight the need for further empirical and analytical review of police reform in post-conflict states, specifically as it relates to SSR, ROL and donor behaviors in implementing those programs and establishing effective police functions.

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ABHILASH PRASANN

FOREWORD

Coups d'état are notoriously misunderstood political phenomena that deserve attention and rigorous academic review. The author of the following piece takes a step in this direction by carrying out a well-designed quantitative comparison of two countries – Bolivia and Argentina – and testing the question: do coups d'état affect the likelihood of an occurrence in neighboring countries and do neighboring countries sharing similar cultural demographics impact such an outcome?

While the author makes a fine case, there are certain things that the reader must keep in mind regarding this hypothesis. There are factors that can be crucial in determining whether a coup d'état will be attempted. One such factor is the organizational structure of the nation's military. More centralized militaries may find it easier to mobilize troops for the overthrow of a regime. However, quantifying or finding accurate data on this factor is extremely difficult. Similarly, one may want to consider how much financial or economic control the military has. Certain militaries, like the Pakistani military, have vast control of land and industry, which gives it an advantage from both an economic and a power perspective.

While Bolivia and Argentina are fine examples for a comparative case study on this issue, it is important to keep in mind certain neighboring countries that may provide a counterpoint to some observations made in this study. To use the example of Pakistan once again, the country has experienced a few coups d'état since independence and is a country where the military still has tremendous sway. In contrast, its neighbor India has not seen a single coup d'état during the period. Despite being culturally similar, the two have a violent history with one another. Finally, India has neither a centralized military nor one that is extremely significant in terms of financial resources it can marshal, unlike Pakistan.

As the reader considers the following piece, it is worth keeping such factors in mind. That being said, the study is a useful addition to existing literature on the topic. After all, the point of academic research is to build on that which came before and draw new inferences or expand the base of knowledge. The author's 'off-the-beaten track' outlook on coups d'état and his use of excellent data makes the study a must-read, even if one can find points of disagreement.

An Inquiry into the Ripple Effect of Coups d'État

CALEB SCHMOTTER

The concepts of fractionalization and “cross-cuttingness”¹³³ found most frequently in the conflict studies literature seek to operationalize the diversity that can be found across the many cultures of the world, such that its impact can be quantified. Of great interest is to what extent various cultural cleavages — of which ethnicity, language, and religion generally receive the greatest focus — impede or enhance the transfer of information from one polity to another. The types of information transfers that could be analyzed are myriad — domestic unrest, types of torture used or prohibited, the signing of treaties and alliances — but one area that begs further exploration is that of military takeovers of government, or coups d'état. It has been argued that coups taking place in one state have a spillover or contagion effect, thus making the likelihood of a coup in a nearby country more likely.¹³⁴ As Egil Fossum wrote, “Finally we have shown that coups in many instances were not without consequences for other countries, in that they contributed to triggering off coups in neighboring countries.”¹³⁵ However, the quality of the evidence used to support this trend has proved

¹³³ Joel Sawat Selway, “The Measurement of Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Other Multidimensional Cleavage Structures” in *Political Analysis* 19, No. 1 (2011), 48–65.

¹³⁴ Brian L. Pitcher, Robert L. Hamblin, and Jerry L. L. Miller, “The Diffusion of Collective Violence” in *American Sociological Review* 43, No. 1 (February 1978), 23.

¹³⁵ Egil Fossum, “Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups D'Etat in Latin America” in *Journal of Peace Research* 4, No. 3 (September 1967), 228–51.

to be less than satisfactory.¹³⁶ In order to be able to determine the potential effects of culture, one must establish a baseline relationship between coup events and their coup-triggering effects on neighboring states. If in fact a relationship can be found, the discovery of a link between culture and the transmission of information will be that much more powerful. In the pursuit of this greater inquiry, one must ask a question comprised of two parts: (1) is a state more likely to experience a coup if a nearby state recently experienced a coup; and (2) does a similar cultural demographic have an enhancing effect on this likelihood? This paper seeks to answer the first part of this question, via a logistic time-series analysis of Argentina and Bolivia from 1950 to 1995. As states that have been plagued by hostile military takeovers of their governments, these two states provide more coup events for study compared to any other polities in the world.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Coups and their associated risks are important insofar as they relate to human rights because of the higher degree of human rights abuses that take place under the resulting non-democratic-regimes. After decades of study, the literature addressing the causes of coups is vast. This has allowed for a wide variety of contributing factors to be tested and analyzed in the quest to create an ever more predictive model. On the other hand, so many studies have been done that it becomes difficult to sort out what are the most significant factors. One of the first and most logical causes identified was military officers' personal grievances against the ruling group.¹³⁷ While likely a factor in almost every case, the highly individualistic nature of

¹³⁶ Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, No. 5 (October 2003), 594–620.

¹³⁷ William R. Thompson, "Corporate Coup-Maker Grievances And Types Of Regime Targets" in *Comparative Political Studies* 12, No. 4 (January 1980), 485–96.

personal grievances makes it also likely that there is always a certain segment of military officers that look unkindly upon the current regime at any particular time. Similarly, the concept of military organizational grievances suffers from statistical difficulties related to measurement and identification, as all militaries have grievances on one level or another. Other attributes of the military, like its national security doctrine¹³⁸, officer political culture, and level of professionalism,¹³⁹ have been found to play a role in the likelihood of a coup but suffer from issues of classification, measurement, and a lack of data for large-N studies.¹⁴⁰

In his 1967 analysis of factors contributing to coups in Latin America, Egil Possum showed that “some socio-economic characteristics of countries seem particularly conducive to the occurrence of military coups, notably size and poverty.”¹⁴¹ Possum first theorized that larger nations possessed more regional rivalries, creating conflicting interest groups that may choose to overthrow the government in order to secure their dominance. Second, Possum argued that based on the empirical evidence, poverty contributes to coups by making the vast majority of the population unable to challenge the elite. As a result, one is left with a “big-poor nation” where local elites exercise a disproportionate amount of control in the governance of the state, up to and including that ability to pursue extrajudicial takeovers. Additionally, Possum “demonstrated that the coups often concentrated around election times and in periods with a deteriorating economy.” Other

¹³⁸ Alfred C. Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* Princeton Legacy Library, Book 1795 (Princeton University Press, 2015).

¹³⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002).

¹⁴⁰ Belkin and Schofer.

¹⁴¹ Fossum.

authors, including S.E. Finer,¹⁴² D. A. Hibbs,¹⁴³ and E. Luttwak,¹⁴⁴ defined “domestic political crisis” as another related cause of coups d’état, the theory being that as increased uncertainty breeds increased discomfort, the military will act to bring a semblance of order back to the nation and head off the opportunity for a government hostile or unfavorable to the military to form.

In 2003, Arron Berlin and Evan Schofer carried out a robust survey of the causes of coups that had been proffered over the years. Of the 21 causes identified, they found five amenable to large-N analyses, supported by high quality statistical evidence, and linked by a compelling theoretical mechanism to coups: participation in war/military defeat; economic development/wealth; the strength of civil society; regime legitimacy; and past coups in the same country.¹⁴⁵ Subsequent analyses revealed that the size of the military played a significant role in affecting the likelihood of a coup after one had taken place. Since Belkin and Schofer focused exclusively on the structural or “background” causes of coups, they chose to exclude several immediate or “triggering” causes of coups in their analysis (like a recent military defeat). As this inquiry has no such limitation, the independent variables under consideration include controls for several causes found to be significant in the literature as well as other exploratory and “triggering” variables.

¹⁴² S. E. Finer and Jay Stanley, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction, 2002).

¹⁴³ Douglas A. Hibbs, *Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis* (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1973).

¹⁴⁴ Edward Luttwak, *Coup D’état: A Practical Handbook* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

¹⁴⁵ Belkin and Schofer.

THEORY, HYPOTHESES, AND METHODOLOGY

A challenge faced by all studies of coups d'état is the infrequency of the phenomena. In order to compensate, many statistical explorations have been forced to look globally, pooling all coups d'état events together. Unfortunately, such an approach here would be impractical. In order to gain any insight regarding the transfer of information between states (in this case, via coups d'état), each state would need to be matched with every other state over some period of time. For example, looking 200 states over a period of 40 years would result in more than 800,000 country-pair-years (e.g. France-Germany 1960), most of which would yield little to no useful information (i.e. it is unlikely that the Angolan coup d'état of 1974 contributed to coups d'état in Asia or South America the next year). Furthermore, the literature suggests there is a cumulative effect coups d'état have on the likelihood of subsequent coups d'état. As a result, the model should account for the effects of a coup d'état over time within the state as well.

For these reasons, Argentina and Bolivia in the period from 1950 to 1995 were selected for analysis as 1) both states experienced numerous coup d'état during this time; 2) both states occupy the same world region to allow for the theorized coup d'état spillover effects; and 3) the cultural attributes they share (e.g. colonial history) help to minimize the statistical noise caused by variables not included in the proposed model. As the dependent variable, whether at least one coup d'état took place in a given year, is binomial, this analysis is carried out using time-series logistic regression. One of the benefits of using this particular type of regression analysis is that it allows for a probabilistic investigation into what factors are most useful in predicting the occurrence of coups d'état. This paper argues that the likelihood that a coup d'état will occur is related to several factors, and that the effects of these factors are sensitive to the passage of time. For the sake of brevity, these variables can be summarized in two general categories: those that increase the likelihood of a coup d'état (a recent domestic coup

[RC], a coup taking place in a bordering country [BC], a successful border coup [BCS], military expenditures [ME], and the number of military personnel [MP]), and those that decrease the likelihood of a coup d'état (an unsuccessful border coup [BCU], real GDP per capita [rGDP], growth rate of real GDP per capita (lagged one year)[GR], political contestation [Con], and political inclusiveness [Inc]).

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

Preliminary analysis of the tolerance values (i.e. the degree to which a variable captures unique information not already accounted for by other variables) for each independent variable showed that two pairs, political contestation/inclusiveness and military expenditures/number of personnel, experienced a significant degree of overlap. Therefore, these variables were combined (Strength of Polyarchy [SP] and Overall Military Capability [OMC], respectively), reducing the number of independent variables from ten to eight. In the interest of parsimony, the variables “border coup (unsuccessful)” and “real GDP per capita” were dropped from the final model due to a lack of statistical significance ($p > 0.9$), a lack of substantively significant effects (absolute value of $\beta < 0.0001$) in the case of “real GDP per capita,” and extreme multicollinearity in the case of “border coup (unsuccessful)” ($VIF \approx \infty$). This resulted in six independent variables for this statistical model, written algebraically as follows:

$$H_{final} : \log\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_{RC} X_{RC} + \beta_{BC} X_{BC} + \beta_{BCS} X_{BCS} - \beta_{GR} X_{GR} - \beta_{SP} X_{SP} + \beta_{OMC} X_{OMC} + \epsilon$$

The Durbin-Watson statistic reveals the amount of serial correlation, also called autocorrelation, between error terms over time. Serial correlation can result in an underestimate of the standard error in a statistical model, which then can cause variables to appear to be statistically significant when

they are in fact not. Analysis of the Durbin-Watson statistic in this model allows us to accept the null hypothesis that no positive serial correlation exists in the Argentina case. However, in the case of Bolivia the test is inconclusive. Attempts to correct for potential serial correlation of the error term include lagging variables, reintroducing previously excluded variables, and removing statistically insignificant variables. None of these attempts were successful in affecting the Durbin-Watson statistic for Bolivia; in fact, the statistic showed remarkable stability regardless of whichever attempt at correcting for serial correlation was applied. A deeper exploration of the Bolivian case can be found later in this section.

Table 1: Logistic Analysis of Argentina from 1950-1995

-2 Log likelihood: 39.183			Cox & Snell R Square: 0.288		
Variable Name	Beta Value	Significance (p)	Exp(B)	Odds Ratio	Probability
Recent Coup [RC]	0.186	0.900	1.204	3.33	76.92%
Border Coup [BC]	-2.537	0.078*	0.079	1.08	51.97%
Border Coup (Successful) [BCS]	3.248	0.040**	25.751	$> 1.5 \times 10^{11}$	~100%
Growth Rate of Real GDP per capita [rGDP]	-0.184	0.050**	0.832	2.30	69.68%
Strength of Polyarchy [SP]	-0.738	0.029**	0.478	1.61	61.73%
Overall Military Capability [OMC]	-0.795	0.066*	0.452	1.57	61.11%
Constant	-2.257	0.008**	0.099		

Notes: * = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; all odds ratios should be understood as the listed value:1

Table 1 shows the results of the time series logistic regression for Argentina from the years 1950 to 1995. The model was able to correctly

predict whether a coup d'état event would take place or not for 76.1% of the years analyzed, with the same total number of coups d'état predicted as was observed, but at different times. The log likelihood and Cox & Snell R Square values are other descriptions of the fit of the model when compared to the data. Unfortunately, both are best used to compare the fit of the same model with different specifications, making both somewhat difficult to interpret independent of comparable studies. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the Cox & Snell R Squared measure has an upper bound of less than 1, which varies with the marginal proportion of cases with events. Thus, these statistics have been provided in the spirit of transparency and replicability but are of limited utility.

The far more interesting results can be found within the lower sections of the Table 1. First, “recent coup” has the expected sign (+) suggesting that previous coups d'état do indeed encourage subsequent coups d'état. However, this variable has an almost shockingly low level of significance, suggesting that at least in the case of Argentina it makes for a poor predictor, even after controlling for the effects of other variables. All other variables achieve statistical significance at or near the traditional 5% cutoff level, and therefore warrant further discussion.

The variable “border coup” shows an unexpected sign (-) suggesting that coups d'état in bordering countries actually decrease the likelihood of a coup d'état in Argentina. While the magnitude of the B value is high, this does not translate into an impressive effect on the odds; as can be seen in the table, a coup d'état in a bordering state gives 1.08:1 odds (or roughly a 52% chance) of a coup d'état not occurring in Argentina, amounting to little more than a coin flip. The negative sign and unimpressive predictive power of this variable is likely due to the fact that the “border coup” variable includes both successful and unsuccessful coups d'état, especially when compared to the next predictor variable.

“Border coup (successful),” highlighted in green, not only is statistically significant and shows the expected sign (+), but also provides near certain predictive power. Based on the Exp(B) value, if a state bordering Argentina experiences a successful coup d’état event, there are better than 150,000,000,000 to 1 odds (virtually a 100% chance) that Argentina will experience a coup d’état in the next year. This somewhat surprising result is by far the most impressive of all the predictor variables tested.

Both “growth rate of real GDP per capita” and “strength of polyarchy” show the expected signs (-) supporting the hypotheses that they have a negative relationship with the likelihood of a coup d’état event taking place. Thus, higher real GDP growth rates and stronger democratic elements of society lower the likelihood of a coup d’état, with odds of 2.30 to 1 (~70%) and 1.61 to 1 (~62%) of a coup d’état not occurring, respectively.

While statistically significant as a predictor, “overall military capacity” shows an unexpected sign (-), suggesting that greater military expenditures and more personnel decrease the likelihood of a coup d’état event. This may be because of a lack of nuance in the measure. Higher levels of military expenditure may denote a stronger economy overall, while greater numbers of military personnel may also denote a more established military structure. Both of these elements may in fact be more descriptive of established governmental norms, rather than the military itself. Repeated studies of this phenomenon may enjoy more success by focusing instead on the proportion of government spending that goes to the military and military personnel per capita as better measures of the strength of the military relative to the state under investigation.

Table 2: Logistic Analysis of Bolivia from 1950-1995

-2 Log likelihood: 49.566			Cox & Snell R Square: 0.213		
Variable Name	Beta Value	Significance (p)	Exp(B)	Odds Ratio	Probability
Recent Coup [RC]	0.503	0.721	1.653	5.22	83.93%
Border Coup [BC]	0.552	0.702	1.737	5.68	85.03%
Border Coup (Successful) [BCS]	0.425	0.763	1.529	4.61	82.19%
Growth Rate of Real GDP per capita [rGDP]	-0.092	0.302	0.913	2.49	71.36%
Strength of Polyarchy [SP]	-0.415	0.052*	0.660	1.93	65.93%
Overall Military Capability [OMC]	-0.370	0.158	0.690	1.99	66.60%
Constant	-1.649	0.033**	0.192		

Notes: * = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; all odds ratios should be understood as the listed value:1

Table 2 shows the results of the time series logistic regression for Bolivia from the years 1950 to 1995. The model was able to correctly predict whether a coup d'état event would take place or not for 67.4% of the years analyzed, with the same total number of coups d'état predicted as was observed, but at different times.

All three “coup” variables show the expected sign in the Bolivian case (+), suggesting that coups d'état in Bolivia or in bordering countries (successful or not) promote subsequent domestic coups d'état. Furthermore, all three variables do so at approximately 5 to 1 odds, or with an ~83% chance of a coup d'état event taking place. However, none of the three “coup” variables achieved statistical significance, making them poor predictors overall of coups d'état in Bolivia.

The variable “overall military capacity” again possesses an unexpected sign (-), most likely for the same aforementioned reasons, with nearly 2 to 1 odds (~66%) that a coup d’état will not occur for every one unit increase in the predictor variable. However unlike in Argentina, this variable does not come close to reaching statistical significance, making predictions based off this variable untrustworthy at best.

As in the case of Argentina, “growth rate of real GDP per capita” and “strength of polyarchy” show the expected signs (-) supporting the hypotheses that they have a negative relationship with the likelihood of a coup d’état event taking place. Thus, higher real GDP growth rates and stronger democratic elements of society lower the likelihood of a coup d’état, with odds of 2.49 to 1 (~71%) and 1.93 to 1 (~66%) of a coup d’état not occurring respectively. However, unlike in Argentina, “growth rate of real GDP per capita” failed to achieve statistical significance, making it a worthwhile predictor in the Argentinean but not the Bolivian case. In fact, “strength of polyarchy” is the only variable that achieves statistical significance at or near the 5% cutoff.

When attempting to discover reasons for why this is so, one must reflect back on the indeterminate results of the Durbin-Watson statistic. Potential serial correlation between the error terms from one year to another could result in poor estimations of significance. Serial correlation can be caused by dramatic shocks to the system, which ripple along the timeline in the form of inflated or deflated error. Interestingly the primary subject of this study, coups d’état, is one such example of a “shock” making it difficult to point to any one event as severe enough to cause serial correlation of the error terms. Instead, the problem may be that that this study begins in the middle of a tumultuous period in Bolivia. From 1932-1935, Bolivia fought an inconclusive war with Paraguay that left more than 100,000 dead. In 1941, the leftist Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) was formed, serving as the primary opposition force to the government and

participating in a series of violent coups d'état and counter-revolutions from the 40s onwards.¹⁴⁶ This missing data could in fact be contributing to the lack of significance across the board for the model. A refinement of this study would be wise to widen the range of years analyzed, assuming data could also be found for the predictor variables over the same time period (which was the main limitation in compiling the dataset).

Another possibility is that Bolivia simply differs markedly from Argentina, in ways not captured by the current model. While these two states make excellent cases for analysis due to their high number of coup d'état events, shared border, and legacy of colonialism, they still possess marked differences. Demographically, Bolivia has the largest indigenous population of all of South America; so much so that indigenous people constitute the majority of the state, whereas Argentina is far more European both ethnically and culturally.¹⁴⁷ This divide is evidenced further by the high levels of poverty and low levels of education for much of the indigenous population in Bolivia, particularly during the earlier segment of the timeframe investigated.¹⁴⁸ This may also help to explain why the “strength of polyarchy” variable was found to be significant, where other predictors were not. During the first two decades of the 20th century, the electorate doubled in size (a dramatic change to say the least), but only from 2.5% to 5% of the population.¹⁴⁹ Any expansion in the size of the electorate (captured by the inclusiveness measure, which is then folded into the “strength of polyarchy” predictor variable) would be relatively significant. If this is indeed the case, correcting the timeline should cause the “strength of polyarchy” to become an increasingly powerful predictor.

¹⁴⁶ Bamber Gascoigne, “HistoryWorld,” History of Bolivia, *HistoryWorld* (blog).

¹⁴⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, “Bolivia” in *The World Factbook*, May 25, 2018.

¹⁴⁸ Harold Osborne, *Bolivia, a Land Divided* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985).

¹⁴⁹ Gascoigne.

CONCLUSIONS

This study provides tentative evidence for the hypothesis that coups d'état in one state can contribute to coups d'état in other states nearby. However, the results also raise the specter of whether such a generalization can be made for all states. In the case of Argentina, there is great support; however, the Bolivian case raises far more questions than it resolves. The comparatively poorer fit for the model also suggests that a better theoretical framework should be created for Bolivia before hard and fast conclusions can be drawn, but this paper will attempt to elucidate one overarching concept that can guide future investigations.

Based on the results of the Argentinian and Bolivian cases, it appears that states that have experienced a coup d'état can be divided into two groups, hereafter referred to as “seeder” states and “feeder” states. Seeder states can be defined as ones in which coups d'état are caused by intrinsic or domestic factors. Economic destabilization, a dramatic military defeat, weak institutional norms, or a military apparatus unwilling to cede control to the civilian population are all potential contributing factors in a seeder state. Once the coup d'état occurs, a seeder state has a rippling effect on those states unlucky enough to share a border - so called feeder states. Seeder states can then be understood as a type of “patient zero” in regards to the contagion effect of coups d'état, whereas feeder states are ones in which coups d'état are triggered by the destabilization effect of a neighbor's successful coup d'état - i.e. the coup has been “fed” due to the perpetrators' enhanced estimation of success. If this is true, the prevention of coups d'état becomes all the more important, due to the magnifying, rippling impact an otherwise relatively powerless state may have on more influential neighbors.

Of course, more case-by-case analyses would need to be undertaken to fully support such a theory. But even taken as is the results of this study answer, at least in part, one of the questions asked at the outset; namely (1) is a state more likely to experience a coup if a nearby state recently

experienced a coup? The answer is yes, at least in some cases. Therefore, there appear to be grounds for further inquiry into the latter question: (2) does a similar cultural demographic have an enhancing effect on this likelihood? A refinement of this study, followed by the pursuit of the second question, should provide a rich program for future research.

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The Soviet Vietnam: An Analysis of CIA Intervention in the Soviet-Afghan War

JORDAN INDERMUEHLE

“Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war.”

Zbigniew Brzezinski, interview with Le Nouvel Observateur in 1998¹⁵⁰

Operation Cyclone was a covert CIA operation implemented during the Soviet-Afghan War that sought to arm and train indigenous Afghan guerilla insurgents in order to maximize costs for the Soviet invaders. The goal was to escalate the situation and thus create a Vietnam-like quagmire for the USSR, as Mr. Brzezinski explained. The CIA-led program would become the largest covert operation in U.S. history. It also included British, Chinese, Pakistanis, Saudis, Iranians, and thousands of other foreign Islamic fighters motivated to join the jihad. In the end, the massive flow of material, training, and intelligence proved too much for the limited war efforts of the Soviet Union. Demoralized abroad and under pressure at home, the USSR would cease to exist by 1991.

¹⁵⁰ David Gibbs, "Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect," *International Politics* 37, No. 2 (2000): 241-242, http://dgibbs.faculty.arizona.edu/brzezinski_interview.

The decade-long war in Afghanistan assuredly played an important role in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Empire, but ambiguity persists regarding the extent of the effect Operation Cyclone had on the fragility of the Soviet state and the potential rise of Islamic terror. Brzezinski's assertion that U.S. operations were crucial for propping up Afghan guerrillas and creating a Vietnam-type situation for the Soviets is supported by many experts. Yet, the Soviet Union entered the war constrained by domestic considerations and a "limited war" strategy that was dubious from the beginning. It can also be argued that the largest covert operation in history was unnecessarily expanded to the point where, disastrously, the United States would indirectly fuel the rise of Islamic fundamentalists and global jihad in the decades to come. Operation Cyclone was ultimately successful in raising the costs for Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, but the indirect support for jihadism during the war would generate significant backlash for U.S. foreign policy and national security in the current era.

ORIGINS OF OPERATION CYCLONE

At first glance Operation Cyclone appears to be a reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, but further examination reveals a more concerted effort to draw the USSR into a protracted and costly conflict. In fact, the CIA assistance program started six months prior to invasion, as then National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski admitted in a 1998 interview:

The reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I

*explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.*¹⁵¹

Brzezinski explained how the Carter administration understood the risk that American intervention in Afghanistan might escalate the conflict. He claimed that U.S. actions were not intentionally meant to provoke the Soviets to further action, but by engaging in covert operations, the Carter administration knowingly increased the probability.¹⁵² This admission was also promulgated by Robert Gates in his memoir.¹⁵³ Such a revelation coming from the highest circles of U.S. foreign policymaking provides a clear understanding of the mindset and purpose of the administration in launching Operation Cyclone. The United States was in fact poking the bear in Afghanistan, prior to the Soviet invasion, to deliberately craft a situation in which “for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war that was unsustainable for the regime, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.”¹⁵⁴

Another consideration for U.S. policymakers was the geostrategic importance of Afghanistan. The country was a key access point for the USSR to reach multiple strategic targets in South Asia and the Middle East. The vital role of Afghanistan was explained by a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report issued days after Soviet troops entered the country: “The key motivation that propelled Moscow’s move was to bring its long-standing strategic goals closer within reach. Control of Afghanistan would be a major step toward overland access to the Indian Ocean and to domination of the Asian sub-continent.”¹⁵⁵ In addition, President Carter warned the Soviet

¹⁵¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur* (1998).

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 146-147.

¹⁵⁴ Brzezinski, interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur* (1998).

¹⁵⁵ Steve Galster, “Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy 1973-1990,” in *Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War*, vol 2. of *The September 11th Sourcebooks*, George Washington University

Union on January 23, 1980, that "[a]n attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region [would] be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and [would] be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."¹⁵⁶ Faced with criticism by Cold War hawks and in the midst of a presidential campaign, the President espoused what would become known as the "Carter Doctrine." Building on the popular appeasement argument that "aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease," he pursued a strategy to confront Soviet aggression while avoiding a large-scale American military intervention.¹⁵⁷ But in time, the covert operation would become, in the words of CIA officer Gust Avrakotos, the "equivalent of a presidential declaration of war."¹⁵⁸

As a secondary goal of Operation Cyclone, U.S. policymakers were also confident that demonstrating support for the Mujahideen would improve relations with the wider Islamic world, especially in the wake of the Iranian revolution hostage crisis and the 1982 Beirut Marine barracks bombing. Panagiotis Dimitrakis explained how CIA officials "saw this arms program as a unique opportunity for the U.S. to be viewed as a friend of the Islamic world."¹⁵⁹ A majority of Congress and the foreign policy establishment in Washington, D.C. supported the cause of the Afghan insurgents, most notably Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson, a self-described "Afghanophile" who was crucial in the public campaign to increase support for the Mujahideen. Ronald Reagan was also a strong supporter of the effort, declaring that "the Mujahideen were the moral equivalent of our own

National Security Archive (Oct 9, 2001),
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html#12>.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History* (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2003), 167.

¹⁵⁹ Panagiotis Dimitrakis, *The Secret War in Afghanistan: The Soviet Union, China and the Role of Anglo-American Intelligence* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 153.

Founding Fathers.”¹⁶⁰ Whether Afghanistan was the Soviet Vietnam, a strategic imperative, or a public relations campaign to Muslims, the CIA had already embarked on path that would prove decisive to the balance of the Cold War and have significant implications for U.S.-Islamic relations in the coming decades. The Carter and subsequent Reagan administrations were convinced of the efficacy and importance of arming anti-Soviet forces for both inflicting harm on the Soviet Union and improving U.S.-Muslim relations.

NATURE OF CIA OPERATIONS

The covert assistance program was not as covert as originally envisioned: by 1980, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan had publicized the U.S. role in arming the Mujahideen, in addition to initiating a discussion of whether to provide Stinger missiles to the insurgents.¹⁶¹ Assistance was initially rather modest, as the CIA and some members of the upper echelons of the Carter administration were skeptical of the ability for covert actions to yield intended results. Robert Gates warned of the absence of high-quality intelligence from the ground in Afghanistan and specific information on the insurgent groups they would be supporting. Nevertheless, by January 1980 the CIA began sending light Russian-made arms and ammunition to their connections in Pakistan.¹⁶² Pakistan and their Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) would become the central cog in Operation Cyclone, on whom the CIA depended almost entirely for channeling assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen.

¹⁶⁰ Kurt Lohbeck, *Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIA's Secret War in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1993), 160-61.

¹⁶¹ Dimitrakis, *The Secret War in Afghanistan*, 149.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

Until the mid-1980s, the CIA avoided transferring American-made weapons to the Afghans, preferring instead to use Warsaw Pact weapons to match what was captured by the Mujahideen on the battlefield from Soviet troops. In addition, weapons were procured from Egypt, China, Poland, and on the international black market. The global operation to acquire weapons was so extensive that “by late 1986 there were so many agencies spending and distributing so many hundreds of millions dollars for so many countries that no agency could keep track of it all.”¹⁶³ All of this weaponry flowed to Pakistan’s ISI, which then had sole responsibility and discretion to distribute it to the leaders of the various Mujahideen tribes. Positive relations with Pakistan became an important aspect of Operation Cyclone, requiring figures like Bill Casey, then-director of CIA, to build personal relationships with General Zia and others in Islamabad to ensure that U.S. assistance reached its destination. Other efforts were made by President Carter to improve relations, who personally phoned General Zia soon after the Soviet invasion to offer \$400 million in support.¹⁶⁴ President Reagan went even further by offering a massive six-year aid package to Pakistan, placing them among the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid.¹⁶⁵

The network that sustained the flow of foreign finances and materiel was an extensive global operation, involving the Saudi Bank for Commerce and Credit International (BCCI), smugglers and international criminals, and drug kingpins.¹⁶⁶ Every dollar spent by the Americans and CIA was matched by the Saudis, and eventually totaled hundreds of millions per year. Mohammad Yousaf, Director-General of ISI in Kabul during the war, explained how “the foremost function of the CIA was to spend money... The CIA supported the Mujahideen by spending the American taxpayers’ money, billions of it over the years, on buying arms, ammunition and

¹⁶³ Lohbeck, *Holy War, Unholy Victory*, 182-186.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ Gastler, “Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy 1973-1990.”

¹⁶⁶ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 8-9.

equipment.”¹⁶⁷ The entire apparatus was fraught with corruption and waste, as an estimated 70 percent of assistance never made it to the Mujahideen. A Washington Post article from 1987 summed up the situation: “We have found that the CIA’s secret arms pipeline to the Mujahideen is riddled with opportunities for corruption. The losers are the poorly equipped guerrillas fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the American people whose congressional representatives have been betrayed by the CIA.”¹⁶⁸ However, Yousaf excused the CIA for these flaws in the operation when he stated: “As soon as the arms arrived in Pakistan the CIA’s responsibility ended... what happened once the weapons arrived in Pakistan was our responsibility.”¹⁶⁹

The CIA was not only supporting the Mujahideen with materiel and financial assistance. Another critical aspect of Operation Cyclone was training and intelligence cooperation that turned the tide in the Mujahideen’s favor in many battles with the Soviets. Yousaf stated confidently how “the richest military contribution of the CIA to the Afghan war was in the field of satellite intelligence.”¹⁷⁰ CIA may have lacked knowledge of indigenous conditions in Afghanistan, but they were capable of employing U.S. technological superiority to great advantage for the Mujahideen. Yousaf described his fascination with the CIA’s ability to intercept radio transmissions of Soviet pilots and of American satellites to capture images of the battlefield, no matter the terrain. He surmised that “this information, in conjunction with the local knowledge of the Mujahideen, considerably enhanced our ability to conduct effective operations.”¹⁷¹ Particularly important was the training for utilizing the new hand-held anti-aircraft Stinger missiles. While Yousaf was often critical of

¹⁶⁷ Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower* (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2001), 81.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 97.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, 93.

¹⁷¹ Yousaf and Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, 93.

and unimpressed by the CIA, particularly with respect to their limited knowledge of military affairs, he acknowledged the role CIA support played in the Afghan victory:

*Notwithstanding all I have said, on balance the CIA's contributions have played a vital role in the conduct of the Afghan Jihad. Without the backing of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, the Soviets would still be entrenched in that country. Without the intelligence provided by the CIA many battles would have been lost, and without the CIA's training of our Pakistani instructors the Mujahideen would have been fearfully ill-equipped to face, and ultimately defeat, a superpower.*¹⁷²

IMPLICATIONS: THE NEXT LONG WAR

Questioner: And neither do you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, which has given arms and advice to future terrorists?

Brzezinski: What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?

Q: "Some agitated Moslems"? But it has been said and repeated: Islamic fundamentalism represents a world menace today...

*B: Nonsense!*¹⁷³

¹⁷² Ibid, 96.

¹⁷³ Brzezinski, interview with Le Nouvel Observateur (1998).

From a geopolitical or *realpolitik* perspective, Operation Cyclone was a tremendous success. The United States limited its costs and worked with partnered governments around the world to defeat their rival superpower in a theater the size of Texas, which worsened Soviet domestic problems and contributed to their eventual downfall. The unipolar moment had finally arrived. Yet, history would reveal the unintended consequences of the U.S. role in that conflict during the coming decades, as global jihad and Islamic terror spread from fighting the Soviet infidel in Afghanistan to fighting the enemy infidels abroad. The Soviets learned this early, as Svetlana Savranskaya explained:

*The Soviet decision makers did not anticipate the influential role of Islam in the Afghan society. There were very few experts on Islam in the Soviet government and the academic institutions. The highest leadership was poorly informed about the strength of religious beliefs among the masses of the Afghan population. Political and military leaders were surprised to find that rather than being perceived as a progressive anti-imperialist force, the Afghans regarded them as foreign invaders, and “infidels.” Reports from Afghanistan show the growing awareness of the “Islamic factor” on the part of Soviet military and political personnel.*¹⁷⁴

The formation of the Taliban out of the Mujahideen – and the Afghan civil war that followed Soviet withdrawal – was fueled by the vast network of financial and military support begun by Operation Cyclone. Private Islamist donors around the world had directly supported the Mujahideen during the war, and continued funding them even after the war’s conclusion.

¹⁷⁴ Svetlana Savranskaya, “The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Russian Documents and Memoirs,” *Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War*, vol 2. of *The September 11th Sourcebooks*, George Washington University National Security Archive (Oct 9, 2001), <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html>.

Robert Dreyfuss, author of *Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam*, explained how, "from the start, the Taliban had strong support not only from Saudi Arabia, which financed it, and from Pakistan, whose ISI intelligence service was the primary force behind the Taliban's conquest of warlord-dominated Afghanistan, but from the United States as well."¹⁷⁵ Indeed, General Zia supported the more fundamentalist groups and purposely channeled the bulk of CIA assistance to their leadership. A Newsweek article published after September 11 revealed a late-1980s conversation between Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and George H.W. Bush, during which she warned, "You are creating a Frankenstein."¹⁷⁶ She warned that the U.S. will ultimately be held responsible for the vast amount of financial and materiel assistance that made its way to jihadist groups. As Dreyfuss explained, this was "a catastrophic miscalculation... it gave rise to a landscape dominated by warlords, both Islamists and otherwise... it created a worldwide network of highly trained Islamist fighters from a score of countries, linked together and roughly affiliated to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda."¹⁷⁷ Such ominous warnings proved incredibly prescient in the coming years. Islamist extremism continues to rise in the world, and though it is difficult to measure, there is little doubt that American support for these groups during Operation Cyclone was significant to its ascendancy. Veteran Middle East and terrorism journalist John K. Cooley's advice, written in 1999, is especially pertinent: "When you decide to go to war against your main enemy, take a good, long look at the people behind whom you chose as your friends, allies,

¹⁷⁵ Robert Dreyfuss, *Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005), 326.

¹⁷⁶ Mark Hosenball, "War on Terror: The Road to September 11," *Newsweek* (September 30, 2001), <http://www.newsweek.com/war-terror-road-september-11-151771>

¹⁷⁷ Dreyfuss, *Devil's Game*, 288.

or mercenary fighters. Look well to see whether these allies already have unsheathed their knives – and are pointing them at your back.”¹⁷⁸

CONCLUSION

Rather than an extended cold war with the Soviet Union, the United States now faces a protracted conflict against global jihadism. It is perhaps fitting that the former adversary of the United States experienced its demise in Afghanistan, in the same desolate country where the U.S. witnessed the victory and preeminence of its current adversary. In this vein, it is difficult to examine the scope of the Soviet-Afghan War and the CIA intervention and declare unequivocally its success or failure. While Operation Cyclone was successful in maintaining the Mujahideen insurgency, the U.S. failed to detect the USSR’s limited military intentions and was therefore overly aggressive in the later years of the war. The long-term consequence of the assistance program was the indirect support of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan, which has since extended its influence throughout the world to threaten global peace and security. The United States achieved the goal of creating a “Soviet Vietnam,” but the costs of such an operation are still being quantified.

¹⁷⁸ John K Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, American and International Terrorism* (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 241.

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